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Introduction
At a certain point, the Universidade Católica Editor asked me to suggest an 
image for the cover of this book. Certainly, I would not repeat the image that 
we had chosen for the book Culture, Translation and Cognition – though I have 
always thought that it says nearly everything that I have to say. However, this 
time it had to be different and somewhat more concrete. Therefore, I started 
to imagine a scene at the bank of the River Rhine near Düsseldorf where I had 
spent many of my Sundays in my younger days. The low and long waves would 
sweep slanting against the beach… While these words came to my mind, I saw 
the small town of Kaiserswerth in the background, involved in the fog of early 
German history. And while the ferry was slowly crossing the river, the image 
blended into Lisbon’s waterfront of my current Sunday mornings as if the Rhine 
flowed into the Tagus River. The bridge would be there to connect the shores 
and the notion of regret for not having been educated to be able to draw or 
paint the scene – or at least to take a picture of it. In the end, I would have to 
resort to one of those image banks which offer views of others for one’s own 
purposes.
Reading through the account of this challenge and holding the book in your 
hands where the cover image is already given, you are thereby introduced into 
the main topics of the following pages. Cognitive Culture Studies aims at study-
ing the relation between mind and culture and their mutual interdependence. 
The mind produces culture as much as it is shaped by it. Culture expresses 
meaning as much as it forms it.
An alternative title to this book could be borrowed from Peter Handke’s The 
Innerworld of the Outerworld of the Innerworld which would count then as an-
other reminiscence of the values of literature as in the quote of Uwe  Johnson’s 
words which I smuggled into the description of the Rhine’s long waves. While 
the relation between cognition and culture is the scientific focus point of these 
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collected studies, literature is the privileged means to come to terms with it. 
The words are a cultural given as much as the image banks in the internet and 
in our memory. How the mind reaches out to its other side in the world out 
there and how this world translates into meaning, this is the overall issue of 
this book.
The first chapter claims the possibility and necessity of intersecting the 
study of culture and cognition, emphasizing the importance of a cognitive cul-
ture system and the interplay of neurons, empathy and literature. The second 
chapter introduces the term ‘tacit knowledge’ as key to understanding how 
culture shapes the mind. The concrete working of such tacit knowledge is 
shown in chapter III on the example of André Jolles’ Einfache Formen and Aby. 
M. Warburg’s Pathos formula. The following chapter presents a different cogni-
tive process in the understanding of literary discourses on history, namely the 
concept of ʻforce dynamicsʼ which in chapter V will also be applied to Walter 
Benjamin’s ninth thesis on history. From Benjamin we take the idea of Utopia 
whose cognitive conditions will be explored in chapter VI. Chapter VII then ex-
plains the fundamental concept of ‘intramental translation’ on the example of 
Christopher Columbus’ non-discovery of the New World. A last chapter brief-
ly alludes to the practical consequences of tacit knowledge and intramental 
translation in the practice of intercultural communication. 
Each of the chapters can be read on its own – or as a continuous accumu-
lation of the underlying argument in showing how culture shapes the mind and 
how the mind forms meaning and culture.
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Chapter I
Intersecting ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’: How the Study  
of Culture Could Enhance Cognitive Science 
Asking how the study of culture could enhance cognitive science is a radical 
question. It is radical in its attempt to reframe concepts in Literary and Cultural 
Studies – and it is even more radical in suggesting that such an endeavour 
could enhance science. In fact, it is not just for the benefit of a ‘reframed’ way 
of studying literature and culture that the following suggestions should be read; 
they should also be read as attempts to bridge science and the humanities for 
mutual improvement of scope and meaning. The disconnectedness between 
science and humanities is one of the main challenges to scientific development 
and knowledge. As we have learned from the history of science (cf. Latour 
1993), the division between nature and culture is historical and artificial. Inter-
secting nature and culture could allow for new insights that re-establish the 
relationship between them. It is in the field of cognitive sciences and under the 
paradigm of culture that such an intersection can productively be developed. 
Culture continues the work of nature, leading to diversity and change. In arts 
and literature, cognition and culture meet in a way that allows one to recog-
nize general principles via artful exploration and contemplation. That is why the 
study of culture does not only produce knowledge about culture itself but it also 
helps to develop a deeper understanding of cognition.
Why and How it Makes Sense to Study Culture and  
Cognition: Towards a Cognitive Culture System
Culture is a multidimensional concept. Following Roland Posner’s proposal 
(1991, 2004), we can distinguish between three different dimensions of culture, 
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namely, social, material and mental. The social dimension refers to the uses of 
culture by individuals, society and institutions. The material dimension includes 
artistic works, architecture and literary and legal texts. The mental dimension, 
finally, has to do with mentalities, perceptions, norms and values. Of course, 
the three dimensions overlap at certain points (institutions comprehend val-
ues, texts express mentalities etc.), which leads to a specific density of cul-
tural issues. In the history of Cultural Studies, questions regarding institutional 
dynamics and analysis of cultural artefacts have clearly been privileged over 
those pertaining to the mental dimension of culture. The sociology of culture 
has evolved as an independent field of study, as has the analysis of artistic 
works and literary or legal texts. In contrast, mental issues seem to have been 
sequestered into the field of psychology without consideration of their cultural 
interdependence with social and material conditions. With the rise of cognitive 
science, such division seems to have been further intensified. The mental di-
mension is reduced to a kind of mechanical intelligence that works like a brain 
machine. 
Looking at the history of the study of culture, this book claims that it is 
necessary to reconsider its mental dimensions – and, looking at the younger 
history of cognitive science, it claims that it is necessary to introduce its cultural 
dimension (cf. Quintais 2009; Zunshine 2010). Comparing an introduction to 
Culture Studies (e.g. Assmann 2012) with an introduction to cognitive science 
(e.g. Castro Caldas 2000) reveals an impressive amount of shared topics that 
are dealt with, albeit from the perspectives of each discipline. ‘Memory’ and 
‘identity’ are the most prominent points of intersection. Both disciplines also 
claim interest and expertise when it comes to questions of ‘signs’ and ‘inten-
tion’, ‘embodied mind’ and ‘extended cognition’. These points of intersection 
have been explored in the context of a quite recently developed branch of Cog-
nitive Studies: ‘Cultural Neuroscience’. Joan Y. Chiao and Genna M. Bebko de-
fine Cultural Neuroscience as being motivated by two fundamental questions 
concerning human nature: 
[H]ow do cultural traits (e.g. values, beliefs, practices) shape neurobiology (e.g. 
genetic and neural processes) and behaviour, and how do neurobiological 
mechanisms (e.g. genetic and neural processes) facilitate the emergence and 
transmission of cultural traits? (2011: 23 f.) 
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The two questions already include two fundamental statements: Cultural 
traits shape neurobiology and behaviour and neurobiological mechanisms fa-
cilitate the emergence and transmission of cultural traits. The strong interrela-
tion of cognition and its neuronal groundings in biology, on the one hand, and 
cultural traits, on the other, could not be stated more clearly. In this conception, 
research on culture and cognition is based on the study of genes in neuro-
genetics, which explains the brain. Social-cognitive-affective Neuroscience is 
used to understand the mind, while cultural psychology deals with culture. 
Surprisingly enough, there is no place for the study of culture in the system 
developed by Cultural Neuroscience, which contributes to the concept’s fun-
damental weakness1. When it comes to defining concrete topics of analysis, 
the authors refer to concepts of culture that do not correspond to the academic 
standards of complexity used in the study of culture. Instead, they develop, 
for instance, a study of the co-evolution of the so-called ‘serotonin transporter 
gene’ (‘5 HTTLPR’) and two types of culture, characterized as ‘individualism’ 
and ‘collectivism’. The difference between these types of culture is based on 
Geert and Gert Jan Hofstede’s (2005) assumptions that cultures can be dis-
tinguished by certain indexes. Hofstede and Hofstede have analyzed cultural 
traits like beliefs, values and behaviours in institutions and organizations across 
nations and have concluded that there are five main indexes that define cul-
tural differences, one of which is the distinction between ‘individualism’ and 
‘collectivism’. Hofstede and Hofstede’s approach is useful and interesting, as 
it offers manageable categories – and, thus, has been impressively success-
ful in all kinds of applied studies. But, nevertheless, the indexes cannot stand 
for the richness and diversity of cultural traits. On the contrary, they are mere 
statistical effects that tend to undermine rather than appreciate the real chal-
lenges of diversity. If, in fact, the distribution of a certain gene can be counted 
across certain populations, cultures cannot be counted or defined in the same 
way. Whether a certain gene exists or not is measurable but collectivism and 
individualism cannot be differentiated as 0 and 1.
The example of individualism and collectivism in culture as discussed by 
Chiao and Bebko draws attention to a second weakness of Cultural Neurosci-
ence: not simply its lack of distinction between cultures but also its lack of a 
1 For further discussion of Cultural Neuroscience, see Joan Y. Chiao et al. (2013) and 
Andreas Roepstorff (2013).
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clear definition of what counts as culture. The authors identify the concept of 
culture as a concept of the nation without questioning the artificiality of nations 
or the existence of cultures defined by other-than-national differences (such as 
religion, age or profession, to give just three instances). 
This brief discussion of the limits of concepts pertaining to Cultural Neuro-
science should, nevertheless, not be read as a rejection of its aims and pur-
poses. On the contrary, the strength of a definition of culturally biased neuronal 
realities should be accompanied by a differentiated concept of culture. Such a 
concept must be developed by scholars who actually deal with the complexity 
of cultural realities. Cultural Neuroscience must be accomplished by Cognitive 
Culture Studies (cf. Hanenberg 2011; Zunshine 2010).
There are further findings in Neuroscience that confirm the need for such an 
interdisciplinary endeavour. One of the crucial discoveries of Neuroscience has 
come to be known as ‘plasticity of the brain’. It has been shown that specific 
parts of the brain perform specific functions but that functions can be performed 
by substituting parts in case of injury. Impressive examples of children with just 
one brain hemisphere have shown how half of the brain can, nevertheless, do 
the whole job, allowing for a “remarkable extent of the plastic potential” (Wexler 
2011: 3). Following Bruce Wexler’s seminal observations, there is a crucial cor-
relation between evolution and cultural development, which can be called ‘cul-
tural evolution’ (cf. Distin 2011). Cultural evolution must be understood as the 
interplay between the plastic brain and new environmental inputs in a world of 
continuously evolving, “largely human-made environments” (Wexler 2011: 2). 
Anthropologist Michael Tomasello (1999) has emphasized the cultural origins 
of human cognition, pointing out the importance of cultural experience in the 
formation of the ways human beings think. The “recurring activation of some 
cells and pathways” (Wexler 2011: 2) can lead to “enduring aspects of neu-
ronal structure” (ibid.). A striking example given by Wexler is the comparison 
between “‘bulked up’ motor cortex in the right hemisphere of string players” 
(ibid.: 12) and the bilateral development “in piano players who practice with 
both hands” (ibid.). Different cultural practices lead to different structures in the 
brain – including size and connectivity of certain cerebral regions.
The two examples discussed thus far yield a first, basic conclusion for the 
study of culture and cognition. In the first case, we recognize a certain genetic 
disposition (concerning the serotonin transporter gene) in co-appearance with 
certain cultural traces (‘collectivism’). In the second case, cultural practice leads 
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to a change in brain structure. Both examples show how close and dense the 
relation between culture and cognition, and between culture and neurobiology, 
can be. For a deep understanding of cultural phenomena such as ‘collectivism’ 
and ‘piano playing’, such relations cannot be ignored. If it is true that ‘collectiv-
ism’ is accompanied by a certain genetic structure, an understanding of ‘col-
lectivism’ must include a certain biological-sciences dimension. And if ‘piano 
playing’ changes the brain, the same biological-sciences dimension explains 
how something may or may not develop. In both cases, the biological effects of 
culture and the cultural effects of biology emerge. Such deep relations between 
what have been considered distinct realms of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ challenge 
their separation in scientific analysis.
How does this scientific analysis work? In the first case, the relationship 
between ‘collectivism’ and ‘5 HTTLPR’ is the result of a statistical observation 
(a high degree of collectivism correlates with a high percentage of 5 HTTLPR). 
In the second case, ‘images’ of brain structure show that certain regions are 
bigger than others. As Wexler writes, they are “visible to the naked eye!” (2011: 
12). In both cases, scientific analysis depends on highly cultural constructs, 
such as statistics and images, which are no natural essences at all: a naked 
eye may see, but it can never understand. There is a highly controversial con-
cept in the first example (i.e., ‘collectivism’) and, in the second example, the 
cultural practice of string and piano playing is reduced to a motor skill, built 
upon the misleading idea that string players use just one hand to play their 
instrument. Defining statistical entities and relations and interpreting images 
are per se highly cultural practices. When they involve cultural traces and prac-
tices, they definitely demand specialized knowledge produced by the study of 
culture. Cognitive Culture Studies would bring together biological and neuronal 
findings, descriptions of cultural constructs and practices (such as ‘collectiv-
ism’ and ‘piano playing’) and an understanding of their mutual effects. 
The endeavour is ambitious. But there is no reason to leave ambition to 
Neuroscience, Psychology or Artificial Intelligence. The study of culture has 
produced knowledge that begs to be articulated in discussions of science. As 
long as science is allowed to reduce culture to simplistic categories, Cultural 
Studies have to claim their critical potential – and enhance science. One first 
step in this direction would be a definition of the cognitive status of culture. 
Such a definition has been offered by Leonard Talmy in a description of what he 
has called “an innately determined brain system” (2003: 373), which he termed 
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a ‘Cognitive Culture System’ (ibid.: 373-415). This system “processes culture 
as a highly differentiated, systematic, and structured complex that includes 
certain categories of phenomena but not others” (ibid.: 373). As language, cul-
ture functions as a brain system, which is in part accessible to consciousness, 
but “consciousness is not a necessary or automatic concomitant of many 
operations of the system” (ibid.: 374). The cognitive culture system operates 
on the basis of “conceptual-affective” and “behavior patterns” (ibid.: 373); its 
“principal function is the acquisition, exercise, and imparting of culture” (ibid.). 
Talmy’s claim is that culture is not something that exists merely ‘out there’ or 
as a Platonic idea somewhere in the heavens of philosophy and history, but 
that it can also be traced back “to a cognitive culture system resident in the 
individual” (ibid.: 414). On the one hand, there is a mental disposition based 
on specific neural provisions and, on the other hand, culture is the result of a 
social process in which acquisition, exercise and imparting of culture refer to 
an interpersonal reality. 
This social process is crucial to the cognitive shaping of the culture sys-
tem. In the acquisition function, the individual acquires certain patterns, 
norms and rules, internalizing a structure that determines the own group and 
outside groups and their members, directing attention to certain categories 
and ways of solving conflicts. The acquisition function, writes Talmy, “may op-
erate most extensively and internalize patterns most deeply during the indi-
vidual’s childhood, [but] it can remain in operation throughout the individual’s 
lifetime, processing cultural changes or transpositions to new cultures” (Talmy 
2003: 374). 
This first function of the cognitive culture system refers already to one of the 
main challenges for the study of culture and cognition. The question is in which 
sense the acquisition function is bound to childhood or open to further shap-
ing during a lifetime. Talmy’s view seems to privilege an open process, which 
would refer to a certain facility in the adaption to new cultural experiences. 
Neurobiological observations by Wexler (2006) emphasize – as we will see – a 
more conservative position, in which the rules, patterns and norms acquired 
in childhood establish an enduring shape in affection, emotion, thinking and 
behaviour. Regardless of the way in which this classical controversy might be 
solved, there cannot be any doubt that the acquisition of cultural patterns is a 
necessary and unpreventable mental process that leads to deep and influential 
cognitive structures. 
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   14 10/05/18   13:48
Intersecting ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’
15
The exercising function of the cognitive culture system “generates a con-
ceptual-affective pattern in the individual and directs the individual in the per-
formance of behavioural practices in accordance with the cultural structure it 
has acquired” (Talmy 2003: 374). The cognitive culture system guarantees a 
continuous congruence between concepts and patterns, on the one hand, and 
behaviour and the ‘world out there’, on the other. As Semir Zeki has shown, the 
“splendors and miseries of the brain” depend exactly on the correspondence 
of the acquired (or inherited) concepts and “our daily experience” (Zeki 2009: 
49). A lack of correspondence between concepts and experience leads to “a 
state of permanent dissatisfaction” (ibid.) or “distress and dysfunction” (Wexler 
2006: 170). In this sense, the cognitive culture system includes necessarily a 
third function that allows for its continuity through imparting and teaching.
This short description of Talmy’s proposal might have shown how urgent 
 issues in the study of culture can be addressed in a way that allows for answers 
based both on the dynamics of cultures and the structural conditions of cogni-
tion. The question of cultural diversity and cultural universals is challenged by 
Talmy’s concept, which claims the “innately determined processing program of 
the cognitive culture system itself” (2003: 375) as being universal and ‘uniform’ 
to all human beings. Of course, the concrete acquisition, exercise and impart-
ing of concrete patterns, rules and norms would allow for diversity, but, at the 
same time, this diversity would refer to a “commonality in the way they are 
structured and in the types of phenomena involved in this structuring” (ibid.). 
On this basis, a dialogue between universal human conditions and the diversity 
of cultural experiences could be productively addressed.
Already at the end of the 1990s, Paul DiMaggio had suggested a study of 
culture in this sense. Trying to join insights from psychology and sociology, his 
approach is based on the assumption “that culture works through the interac-
tion of three forms” (DiMaggio 1997: 273): information, mental structures and 
symbol systems. Culture is firstly made of information held by individuals and 
patterned by common use and memory transfer. Secondly, mental structures 
shape “the way we attend to, interpret, remember, and respond emotionally 
to the information we encounter and possess” (ibid.: 274). And, finally, cul-
ture works through symbol systems that embed meaning and communication 
“in observable activity patterns” (ibid.). The interaction of information, mental 
structures and symbol systems gives rise to the complexity of culture, which 
needs to be considered in its study. 
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While Talmy’s approach allows for a systematic understanding of the func-
tions of a cognitive culture system, DiMaggio’s approach reinforces the neces-
sity for studying concrete information and applied communicative symbols as 
the elements through which the system operates. Cognitive Culture Studies 
should help clarify which ways of organization can be recognized in the field of 
information and symbolic orders – again, on the general level of universal cul-
tural disposition and its emanation as concrete cultural reality. In other words, 
it may help to tackle the question of how a common, maybe neuronal, frame in 
the cognitive culture system translates into cultural actuality. In addition, it may 
clarify whether a common frame in a universal cognitive culture system leads 
to something that could be called ‘the architecture of cultural domains’, which 
is stable in its diversity.
Cultural Diversity and Change:  
Towards the Limits of Adaptation?
Culture varies through space and time. It is a central claim in the study of 
culture that difference is possible and important and that diversity means rich-
ness. But there is a difference also between ‘change in evolution’ and ‘change 
in history’. What can we learn about history from evolution? 
Merlin Donald (1993) has described stages in the evolution of culture and 
cognition that led to what he calls the ‘modern mind’. It is this modern mind 
that counts for diversity and history, for change and difference. “Our brains and 
minds”, writes Donald, “can be deeply affected by the overwhelming influence 
of symbolic cultures during development” (2000: 19). And Donald does not 
just refer to the influence of language and experience on thinking, but he also 
discusses their influence “on a much deeper, architectural, level” (ibid.), which 
“can actually remodel the operational structure of the cognitive system” (ibid.). 
“The clearest example”, explains Donald, “is the extended and widespread ef-
fect of literacy on cognition. In this case, we know that the brain’s architecture 
has not been affected, at least not in its basic anatomy or wiring diagram. But 
its functional architecture has changed, under the influence of culture.” (Ibid.) 
Donald continues:
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The resources of the infant brain can be radically redeployed under the guidance 
of cultural change, which can gain its own momentum. In turn, this phenome-
non, rapid cultural change generation after generation, is made possible by the 
extreme plasticity of the human brain in epigenesis. This crucial characteris-
tic has allowed the human brain to adapt to the ever-faster rates of change 
that have become typical of modern society. It may appear self-evident that our 
brains have proven sufficiently plastic to have allowed us to come this distance, 
but it is not clear how far this trend can continue. We undoubtedly have cogni-
tive limitations as a species, both individually and collectively, and will come up 
squarely against them at some time or another. (Ibid.: 20)
It is this challenge in the ‘cognitive limitations as a species’ to which a com-
mon effort in the study of culture and cognition will have to respond: Plasticity, 
adaptation and ever-faster rates of change, on the one hand, and cognitive 
limitations as a species, on the other. In his study on literacy, Donald has shown 
the increasing importance of “external storage systems” (1993: 269) for cultural 
development; Stanislaus Dehaene (2010) and others have shown the crucial 
development of new functional achievements in cognition; and, more recently, 
Michel Serres (2013) has written a paean of praise to a younger generation that 
picks up their gadgets as Saint Denis picked up his head and continued walk-
ing and talking. How far can it continue? 
Donald’s question, in fact, touches upon a crucial debate in contempo-
rary culture. There are those who find recent cultural changes in information 
and communication technologies to create shallowness and even danger (“Is 
Google Making Us Stupid?”, asked Nicholas Carr in 2008); and there are those 
who continuously praise the advantages of new technologies (“Playing Video 
Games Can Boost Brain Power” was a headline in ScienceDaily on 21 August 
2013). Culture challenges cognition in such a way that one might even reach 
the point at which cognition can no longer support cultural change. 
And cognitive limitations are not only challenged by information and com-
munication technologies. Many other traditional ways of acquiring, exercising 
and imparting culture seem to vanish, as if the whole cognitive culture system is 
becoming weaker and weaker. In an ever faster changing culture, correspond-
ence between an acquired cognitive culture system and daily experience is 
continuously under pressure. Wexler describes the process as follows:
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Internal neural structures are created that correspond to those aspects of envi-
ronmental stimulation that are most commonly experienced by a particular indi-
vidual. These structures then limit, shape, and focus perception on aspects of 
the information stream that are most like themselves. This increases the sense of 
correspondence between the external world and the internal one, and progressi-
vely limits the power of sensory stimulation to change the structures. (2006: 169)
An individual who does not find correspondence between internal neural 
structure and environmental stimulation will have to find a way to reshape either 
his mental structure or environment. “For the remainder of life, the individual 
largely acts to alter the external world to match an increasingly inflexible inner 
world”, writes Wexler (2006: 143). And he continues: 
Projective processes have two components. The first alters the perception and 
experience of the external world according to preexisting internal structures. The 
second alters the course of events in the external, in this case primarily interper-
sonal, world in such a way as to increase the likelihood that subsequent events 
will be consistent with the preexisting internal structures. (Ibid.: 143)
Radical disparities between internal structure and external reality will create 
distress for individuals or entire communities. Wexler identifies such disparities 
historically in the “discovery of different peoples and cultures” (ibid.: 184), which 
means increasing experience of, and exposure to, diversified ways of establish-
ing correspondence between mental structures and environment. In Wexler’s 
view, such an experience might lead to pressure and conflict, which has to be 
considered with caution and in a way that accounts for both factual resistance 
and mental resilience in individuals as well as society at large.
Contemporary culture is undergoing profound changes, which demand 
continuous mental effort and social attention. Wexler acknowledges that such 
changes could even lead to completely new definitions of culture and – Talmy 
would add – the cognitive culture system in general:
The cultural diversity we know today, a mixing of societies that were previously 
differentiated during extended isolation, would be replaced by a diversity born 
of contact among huge numbers of individuals shaped into fluid groups by the 
choices they make from a superabundance of educational and other activities. 
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While these communities of thought, knowledge, activity, and customs might dif-
fer from ethnic and religious communities in interesting ways, I would not be the 
first to call them cultures, and they would create a richly heterogeneous human 
landscape. (Ibid.: 253)
In his reference to ‘fluid groups’, Wexler uses a metaphor reminiscent of 
Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ (2000) – and not by chance: The no-
tion of the experience of culture as one that corresponds to ‘fluidity’ or ‘li-
quidity’ poses remarkable challenges to the definition of culture and its mental 
structure. If the cognitive culture system is becoming ‘fluid’ or ‘liquid’ in a cer-
tain sense, then it might be even more difficult to recognize the way it works. 
Talmy’s suggestion, that the cognitive culture system finds its main functions in 
the acquisition, exercise and imparting of culture, is present in Wexler’s state-
ment about the choices one makes “from a superabundance of educational 
and other activities” (2006: 253). How will these ‘cultures’ relate to the clas-
sical definition of culture as ‘ethnic and religious communities’? How stable 
will such an acquisition be in all its fluidity? How ‘deep’ will it go into mental 
or even neural structures? When do changes disturb the correspondence be-
tween mental organization and environment and when are they inconsequen-
tial? There might be situations in which the natural adaptation to culture may 
no longer be sustained. Will the cognitive culture system be able to adapt to a 
“richly heterogeneous human landscape” (ibid.)? Will this landscape threaten or 
merely challenge the acquisition, exercise and imparting of culture? How much 
of this acquisition is actually a choice (and not an imposition)? What about 
those who do not have any choices in education as a consequence of poverty 
or austerity?
Culture has led to a new kind of change: Historical change is faster than 
evolution. History has allowed for the experience of diversity based on cul-
tural options and the accumulation of knowledge, techniques and practices. 
Human cognition has simultaneously caused and followed this accumulation, 
empowered by the plasticity of its neuronal structure. The materialization of 
this accumulation in the form of culture is what has distinguished and singled 
out mankind from its ancestors. The study of culture and cognition is at the 
very heart of history. Studying the way mankind has structured the relationship 
between culture and cognition is a manifold endeavour. Cognitive science and 
the study of culture will have to work together if they want to understand some 
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of the most surprising mechanisms in this relation, such as the groundings of 
empathy and the case of literature. The conjunction of empathy and literature 
will, therefore, be described as one of those points where future work in Cogni-
tive Culture Studies will certainly be fruitful. 
Cognition Meets Culture: Mirror Neurons and Empathy  
in the Contemplation of Art and Literature
According to Suzanne Keen, ‘empathy’ is “a relatively young term, having 
entered the English language in the early twentieth century as a coined transla-
tion of the German word Einfühlung” (2007: 4). It is interesting to witness how 
the word Empathie is now returning to the German language as something dif-
ferent from what it was a hundred years ago. Of course, the phenomenon itself 
is much older than the German word Einfühlung and its English translation. Fol-
lowing Keen further, we might try to consider the difference between ‘empathy’ 
and ‘sympathy’, though they are closely related to each other. A statement of 
empathy would be ‘I feel what you feel. I feel your pain’, whereas a statement 
of sympathy would be ‘I feel a supportive emotion about your feelings. I feel pity 
for your pain’. Empathy seems to be more radical than sympathy (‘I feel your 
pain.’); sympathy seems to incite action in supportive emotion, which leads to 
further attitudes, or acts, to love and help. Sharing is crucial both to empathy 
and sympathy, and it is clear that both terms point, in a certain sense, to social 
dimensions and social commitments, which seem to lead from biology to ethi-
cal values and moral challenges.
The debate on empathy has been fuelled by the discovery of its biological 
foundation in the so-called mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are the most exciting 
discoveries in human science in the last 20 years. When the Italian neuroscien-
tist in the group led by Giacomo Rizzolatti managed to describe the function-
ing of these neurons for the first time in 1995, a large number of experiments, 
studies, theories and speculations followed (cf. Rizzolatti/Sinigaglia 2008). 
 Rizzolatti and his colleagues started by observing certain cells in the brains of 
monkeys and apes that ‘fired’ when they were not supposed to, which means 
that they exhibited unexpected electrical activity. Some cells that are usually 
active in, for instance, the brain of a macaque monkey grasping a piece of 
fruit showed nearly the same level of electrical activity when the monkey was 
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   20 10/05/18   13:48
Intersecting ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’
21
simply perceiving the act of grasping, that is, when another monkey or a human 
grasped the fruit. 
The conclusion is, indeed, exciting: Perception and action are not categori-
cally separated in the brains of primates, including human beings, as was later 
proved. Subsequent experiments have shown that the mirroring of neuronal 
activity does not occur when subjects simply perceive and execute random 
movements (e.g. stretching the arm). Mirroring occurs in correspondence with 
the intention behind the observed act: Mirror neurons react differently when an 
object, e.g. an apple, is taken and put aside or taken and eaten. Mirror neurons 
do not simply mirror action; they rather mirror the aim behind the action, the 
proper intent of an act. 
This is an observation of far-reaching significance: It is not just about some-
one seeing what someone else does; it is rather about the capacity to under-
stand what the other aims to do. Of course, in a certain sense, this discovery 
is no news, as we already knew from philosophy, history and life that people 
sometimes understand each other. Nevertheless, it was a breakthrough in the 
understanding of the neuronal basis of such capacities, and it definitely chal-
lenged the notion of a clear distinction between some neurons supposedly 
responsible for perception, others for action and others for understanding the 
aims behind actions. The brain does not function according to a division of 
labour. On a neuronal basis, these realms are inseparable. What is needed 
is a holistic perspective in which perception, action and understanding are 
somehow intertwined. When one sees an apple being grasped, the neuronal 
reaction is as if one would grasp the apple oneself. And when one sees some-
one else grasping an apple and eating it, it is as if one were eating the apple 
oneself.
Mirror neurons, thus, join the process of perception, ‘action-activation’ and 
‘intention-identification’ in an inseparable chain of neuronal activity. And there 
seem to be other interesting neurons, namely, the so-called ‘canonical neu-
rons’, which fulfil a subsidiary or subordinated function to mirror neurons. Ca-
nonical neurons do not only react when a certain action can be perceived, but 
they also prepare the motor system for activation, even when there is only an 
object that could be moved, grasped or eaten. Interestingly, canonical neu-
rons adapt motor activation to the physical qualities of the object in observa-
tion, mainly with regard to its size. The study of canonical neurons in humans 
has only recently started and there are still a lot of questions to be answered, 
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namely, regarding their locations and their systematic distinction from mirror 
neurons (cf. Vuck 2009). The discovery of canonical neurons may actually al-
low for far-reaching considerations on how the mere observation of objects can 
sufficiently motivate a whole range of neuronal activities, or at least put them on 
‘standby’ – an idea that must surely be relevant to any discussion of the recep-
tion of arts and literature. 
The discovery of mirror and canonical neurons has caused speculations, 
theories and observations in many scientific fields, including the humanities. 
More recent experiments seem to suggest that mirror neurons are only acti-
vated when one observes the movement of someone else and not when one 
interacts with someone else (cf. Tylén et al. 2012). Mirror neurons fire when 
someone watches someone else grasp a piece of fruit, but they do not fire 
when one deals with someone else with reference to the fruit. If these experi-
ences can be confirmed, we might conclude that mirror neurons’ activity re-
quires the status of observation and not the status of joint action. As long as we 
sit quietly in our corner and observe someone or something, our mirror neurons 
fire sprightly. But as soon as we interact, they seem to switch off. 
If these findings hold true, they would not only be a severe blow to empathy 
enthusiasts (for empathy would be, at best, a contemplative state), but they 
would also demonstrate the fundamental importance of mirror neurons in the 
contemplation of art (cf. Freedberg/Gallese 2007) and the reading of literature 
(cf. Lauer 2007, 2009). Art and, with it, literature are the privileged domains 
of observation and contemplative reception. In art and literature, we find the 
ideal conditions for triggering a veritable explosion of mirror reactions without 
any danger of joint action switching these neurons off. In this sense, there can 
be no doubt that mirror and canonical neurons provide the physiological basis 
for empathy in the reading of literary texts. And it might be evident that art and 
literature invite a kind of pure mirror-neuron intensity – without the unpleasant 
effects struggling to grasp ‘the fruit’. 
The euphoria unleashed by the discovery of mirror neurons has led to even 
more euphoria concerning the concept of empathy and its social importance. 
Probably the most popular example of this euphoria is Jeremy Rifkin’s book 
The Empathic Civilization, in which mirror neurons are simply declared “empa-
thy neurons” (2009: 14). Rifkin uses neurological findings on mirror neurons to 
reinterpret world history and sketch a global philosophy of empathy that could 
lead to practical solutions for future challenges. He writes: 
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We’ve long known that human beings and other mammalian species are ‘social 
animals.’ The discovery of mirror neurons, however, opens the door to exploring 
the biological mechanisms that make sociability possible. (Rifkin 2009: 83)
Rifkin’s point is what he calls the ‘empathic extension’, which refers to the 
brain’s ability to mirror another’s intention as the basis for a conception of an 
empathic civilization: 
Without empathy it would be impossible to even imagine a social life and the 
organization of society. Try to conjure up a society of narcissists, sociopaths, or 
autistically challenged individuals. Society requires being social and being social 
requires empathic extension. (Ibid.: 42) 
As fascinating as this discussion may be, it is always striking how the expe-
rience of literature and cultural history is ignored in the debate2, as if findings in 
the field of Literary and Culture Studies could only be of concern to themselves. 
The long tradition in thinking on mimesis (cf. Abrantes 2014) and compassion 
started by Aristotle continued through the 18th century with the concepts of 
sympathy and sensibility (cf. Keen 2007: 42), the 19th century romantic no-
tion of the ‘sympathetic’, Wilhelm Dilthey’s Verstehen and Robert Vischer’s 
Einfühlung; yet this tradition is widely disregarded. Taking these concepts into 
account in discussions of ‘empathy’ could enhance our understanding of it. 
Empathy is not just a basic neuronal phenomenon; it is also a complex cultural 
construction. Joining neurological findings and cultural history could make evi-
dent how art and literature represent a specialized cognitive competence: the 
ability to observe. Spectatorship is a cultural achievement in evolution, an evo-
lutionary breakthrough for the human species. Observing as a cultural achieve-
ment leads to “metacognition” (Donald 2006: 5), which is what art and literature 
are for.
Such a combination of cognitive science and literature has been  presented 
by Fritz Breithaupt in his book Kulturen der Empathie (‘Cultures of Empathy’), 
published in 2009, which is of interest for two reasons: Firstly, Breithaupt de-
scribes empathy not only as the operation between mother and child and 
2 A rare exception is the groundbreaking article by David Freedberg and Vittorino Gallese from 
2007.
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training in the recognition of intentions and behaviour. Empathy is also the con-
dition for larger social structures and, thus, the foundation of culture. Empathy, 
explains Breithaupt, is not a matter of a relationship between two people; it 
requires a third party who refers to the other two. Breithaupt, thus, describes 
empathy as “taking sides in a triangular relationship” (Parteinahme in einer Drei-
erbeziehung, 152). In addition to this finding, a second hypothesis might be of 
interest, namely, that this understanding of empathy is linked to narrative, to 
the development of the human ability to tell stories. If it is indeed the case that 
we understand by telling stories (Wir verstehen, indem wir erzählen, 10), then 
narrative is an amplifier of empathy, a form of parallel action in the subjunctive 
mode (cf. ibid.: 137). Breithaupt summarizes that empathy is a decision to take 
sides for one (and not the other), which is legitimized emotionally and rationally 
through narrative strategies.3
The ‘third man’ who appears in Breithaupt’s triangular relationship hints at 
the importance of not actually being involved in the struggle, but rather keeping 
an outside position as an observer. As mirror neurons fire when we observe, 
empathy fires under the condition of the third person’s distance. In the case of 
narrative, deeper insights and connections seem to make the picture clearer 
and allow a kind of firing and counter-firing of neuronal reactions, amplified by 
the state of observation. 
Both the debate on mirror neurons and Breithaupt’s approach to ‘the cul-
tures of empathy’ make reference to a theory that should at least be briefly 
mentioned, because it might be a further building block with which the study 
of culture can enhance cognitive science, namely, what has become known 
as the ‘Theory of Mind’ (henceforth ToM). ToM refers to the fact that human 
beings are able to develop ideas of what others think, know, feel and want, as 
expressed in the following phrase frequently quoted in this context: “Of course 
I care about how you imagine – I thought you perceived I wanted you to feel.” 
(Zunshine 2006: 30) As shown by Breithaupt, human beings further develop 
this kind of mind reading by taking a third position in the observation of scenes 
between other people. As spectators of narratives, humans explore certain 
levels of ‘embedded mind reading’. Interestingly, we can even ‘read minds’ 
when there are no minds to be read at all, like peoples’ minds in pictures. We 
3 “Empathie ist eine Entscheidung zur Parteinahme für den einen (und nicht den anderen), die 
durch narrative Strategien emotional und rational legitimiert wird.” (Breithaupt 2009: 175)
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suppose that there is a mind just because we see a face or a certain action or 
exposure or recognize a gaze. 
According to Lisa Zunshine’s arguments in her book Why We Read Fiction 
(2006), literature and fiction allow us, “through a shared capacity[,] to stimulate 
and develop the imagination” (17). And she continues:
It is possible, then, that certain cultural artifacts, such as novels, test the functio-
ning of our cognitive adaptations for mind-reading while keeping us pleasantly 
aware that the ‘test’ is proceeding smoothly. (Ibid.: 18) 
The reading of a novel would be a kind of cognitive exercise, an experiment 
or a test to keep our cognitive abilities active in understanding each other. 
Literature would work, in this sense, as a test arrangement for the stimulation 
and training of empathic competence. Empathy is where knowledge, feelings 
and intentions are shared. In literature, the reader takes the position of a third 
party in which mirror and canonical neurons find the ideal conditions for their 
functioning. The reader’s abilities in ToM are challenged and trained. 
In a similar sense, Keen has tried to describe the relationship between em-
pathy and the novel (which is also the title of her book), though not by building 
her arguments on ToM. At the end of her enlightening introduction to “Contem-
porary Perspectives on Empathy”, she writes: 
That the novel should be singled out as a technology most adept at invoking 
empathy and shaping moral behavior challenges what psychologists have been 
able to discover about empathy, but it endorses what many people believe about 
the transformative power of reading and of reading fiction in particular. Perhaps 
repeated entrances into fictional worlds must occur to benefit the developing 
mind. (2007: 35) 
However, if one tries to prove the effect of novels on empathy by looking at 
the concrete behaviour after reading, one must be disenchanted. Of course, 
those who helped Jews during the Holocaust may not have been more literate 
or more intensive readers than their Nazi counterparts – an obvious example 
that, in my opinion, has nothing to do with empathy and the novel, though 
Keen tries to make us believe otherwise. And it is not convincing “that char-
acters need to be realistic, particularly lifelike, or even fully rounded to invite 
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engagement on the part of readers” (ibid.: 101) and, therefore, allow for empa-
thy. One merely has to ask any young reader whether Harry Potter is an em-
pathic endeavour due to its ‘realistic, particularly lifelike’ characters or whether 
one feels empathy with Hamlet because he is ‘fully rounded’ to see that the 
argument does not hold.
Keen’s book seems to prove that any utilitarian approach to the relationship 
between empathy and the novel must fail. Asking “whether empathy can in 
fact be taught through reading” (ibid.: 11) or if “group survival might be repaired 
by reading” (ibid.: 12) means adopting a functional perspective on the ques-
tion. Though Keen recognizes that ‘didacticism is not required’, she seems to 
search for statistical proof of the immediate effect of novels on the moral and 
ethical attitudes of readers (cf. ibid.: 20). Recent studies have shown that there 
is actually a measurable effect of reading on connectivity in the brain (cf. Berns 
et al. 2013). But there is still a lot of work to be done (cf. Nünning 2014). Keen 
spends only very few words on what she calls ‘narrative techniques’, focusing 
on character identification and narrative situation. I wonder whether we can 
and should actually look for a direct link between narrative techniques and 
(moral) behaviour. We might then mistake statistics for reasoning or – even 
worse – self-description for a veridical account. 
As cultural achievements, reading and reading fiction can only be under-
stood according to their long-term significance, both in terms of a phyloge-
netic perspective of culture and in terms of ontogenetic imparting. Culturally 
acquired, exercised and imparted, the capacity to read literature contributes 
to cognitive development, which builds upon the general ability for empathic 
observation, physiologically grounded in the firing of mirror neurons. The rela-
tionship between perception and conception was mentioned in the discussion 
of Wexler’s perspective on culture and cognition and is applicable to ToM, in 
which observation is related to the identification of intentions. One must have a 
certain notion of which intentions might occur in certain situations to be able to 
identify concrete intentions as such. Identification must somehow predate the 
situation. It must, in a certain sense, exist before the concrete experience. Such 
notions have been named differently: frames, patterns, scripts or concepts.4 
4 Cf. Lenk (1995); Goffman (1974); Pöppel (2006); Shore (1998); Stockwell (2002: 75-89). 
Wolfgang Hallet (2012) has shown how the general ‘concept of concepts’ works in academic 
concepts and what conceptual transfer means.
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Some of these concepts may be innate or inherited, others acquired and syn-
thetic (cf. Zeki 2009). Concepts are crucial for understanding; without con-
cepts, observation would never arrive at the identification of an intention. 
In fact, the human mind is permanently involved in a process of relat-
ing what it perceives to certain conceptions of what the perception could 
mean. This relationship between perception and conception is crucial to our 
world-making and forms the basis of further cultural development. Our minds 
depend on this permanent process of receiving information and transferring 
it into meaning. This process, in which perception demands conception and 
conception builds upon perception, might rightly be called ‘ception’, as Talmy 
has suggested (2003: 139-75). The idea that our perception has to be trans-
formed into meaning, and that we need concepts or categories to transfer 
meaning into perception, is, of course, not new. We find this insight in Imma-
nuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/2007): Whatever we see has to be 
transformed by a mental process to become meaningful. Thus, writes Nelson 
Goodman (1978: 6):
The overwhelming case against perception without conception, the pure given, 
absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, substance as substratum, has been so 
fully and frequently set forth – by Berkeley, Kant, Cassirer, Gombrich, Bruner, and 
many others – as to need no restatement here. Talk of unstructured content or 
an unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating; 
for the talk imposes structure, conceptualizes, ascribes properties. Although 
conception without perception is merely empty, perception without conception 
is blind (totally inoperative).
As Zunshine reminds us in her Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies 
(2010), the importance of this circumstance has been present from the very 
beginning of what has become Cultural Studies, for instance, in Raymond 
 Williams’ The Long Revolution (1965: 33):
The central fact of [the] new account of the activity of our brains is that each one 
of us has to learn to see [.] […] There is no reality of familiar shapes, colours, 
and sounds, to which we merely open our eyes. The information that we receive 
through our senses from the material world around us has to be interpreted, 
according to certain human rules, before what we ordinarily call ‘reality’ forms. 
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The human brain has to perform this ‘creative’ activity before we can, as normal 
human beings, see at all.
We are not simply perceiving fur, legs and eyes, but we are recognizing a 
cat, a rabbit or a dog. We might call this process the ‘translation of perception 
into meaning’ (s. chapter VIII). The famous ambiguous images or reversible 
figures like the rabbit/duck images or the Rubin vase are well-known examples 
of how this process works: The same perceptual input can be ‘seen’ alternately 
as a duck or a rabbit. And once one has discovered both interpretations, the 
mind cannot stop switching from one to the other. It is interesting to experience 
how perception ‘jumps’ every three seconds (cf. Pöppel 2004), a task for which 
our cognition alone is responsible and that is completely independent from any 
change of input. Our cognition seems to be condemned to look out into the 
world at a regular pace to see if anything is new, yet it arrives at varied findings: 
Sometimes it arrives at one concept, then again at another. When we see the 
duck, we cannot see the rabbit and vice versa. One permanently translates the 
perception either into the concept of rabbit or into the concept of duck. 
One can easily imagine how literature and fiction explore this permanent 
process of switching concepts, how they enhance the ability to ‘re-translate’ 
observation, how they use ambiguity to assure attention and guarantee inter-
est. Facing the ambiguity of images (and the world), the brain cannot but relate 
perception to conception. The cognitive culture system allows for the acquisi-
tion, the exercise and the training of concepts as a special mental literacy. This 
literacy offers concepts for either seeing a duck or a rabbit. Without this literacy, 
nothing can be seen. Our capacity to see the other concept depends on train-
ing – on a permanent readjustment of perceptions and conceptions. 
One of the simple motors for enhancing cognition is repetition: You cannot 
avoid the power of repetitive inscription or even imprinting, as you must think 
of the white elephant when you are asked not to think of it. Literature is, in this 
sense, an excellent opportunity to practice the application of concepts. As with 
empathy, the status of the observer is crucial to its occurrence in literature. In 
‘ception’, literature assures what Karl Eibl (2004: 340) calls a ‘discommitted’ 
(entpflichtet) process. This ‘discommittedness’ refers to cognition itself and al-
lows for a cognitive pleasure (Kognitionslust). Whether it is useful or not, cogni-
tion enjoys itself with literature. 
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Studying Mental Conditions and Cultural Change:  
Improving Science 
We cannot understand cultural processes without considering their mental 
conditions. Such mental conditions can be ‘biologically’ described and under-
stood, as experiences in perception theory and the recent discovery of mirror 
and canonical neurons may confirm. One of the biological characteristics of 
the brain is what has been called the ‘cognitive culture system’, which finds a 
specific expression, for instance, in reading literature and experiencing fictional 
worlds. Seen as achievements in evolution, reading literature and experiencing 
fictional worlds are bound to the cultural origins of human cognition. 
Human cognition builds upon common and stable biological conditions (like 
mirror neurons), which adapt evolutionarily to the conditions of concrete envi-
ronments so that cultural forms of exploration may vary from culture to culture 
and throughout history. Human cognition is simultaneously formed (and, there-
fore, tends to stability) and plastic (and, therefore, able to change). Cultural 
history is a history of change. The real challenges in the dynamics of stability 
and change must be attended to in the study of culture, which will then also 
enhance cognitive science. 
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Chapter II:
“My Favourite Things”.  
The proximal term of tacit knowledge
The title of this chapter might remind some readers of the famous John Coltrane 
whose LP with the same title was one of the great Jazz events in the early sixties. 
Maybe others will remember instead the musical “The Sound of Music” com-
posed by Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein from the late fifties, maybe 
even in its Portuguese adaptation on stage some few years ago. Or some others 
might even remember both pieces of music – or should I say the unit that Coltrane 
built upon the Rodgers-Hammerstein original. And if one remembers any adapta-
tion of the melody, one might even hear it, somehow like being in an inner ear.
When I chose the title, I tried to link attention to it with some other experi-
ence that I supposed might be familiar to the reader. And now by remembering 
some moments of the underlying musical experience, I tried to reinforce this 
linking – even for those who even might not have thought on it before. Actually, 
I was trying to support the arguments that I am going to develop by a previous 
aesthetic experience – and of course my intention is to transfer some of the 
good musical mood to what I am going to develop.
Even before I started arguing, I already occupied the reader’s brain by the 
repetition or by the revocation of a former auditory experience, that – as I said 
– some might even have heard inside their mind. “My favourite things” is one 
of those music pieces that we all recognize as something experienced before 
and that – once in our inner ear – is hard to forget. One might be “hearing” 
“My favourite things” even when this chapter is finished, rethinking the title or 
some of its arguments, for instance, or even just by chance, at night, when the 
reader is preparing to go to bed. Tomorrow, “My favourite things” will occur less 
frequently, maybe one will somehow forget it again, until the moment you meet 
the music or the title of my paper again.
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“My favourite things” is part of our tacit knowledge. I will have to explain 
what this means. Of course, its content, the melody itself is not tacit knowl-
edge, but it is knowledge (I know the melody) and it is memory (I remember the 
melody). When they occur, knowledge and memory are an explicit content that 
we can attend to or not. But “My favourite things” is tacit in the way it came up 
to the mind: as the auditory sensation produced by the quotation of a music 
title. What is behind this way of coming out to hear a melody just by reading 
three words? And why can one not forget the melody since I started to draw 
attention on it? One can’t help hearing the melody – and when one is a Jazz-
Fan he will even feel the vibration of Coltrane’s saxophone.
Listening to Coltrane’s piece, we easily recognize the original melody from 
the musical – even though we might not be able to say how and what exactly 
makes us identify it as being simultaneously the same and different. Music spe-
cialists will do the job more easily, but they will not be able to explain the unspe-
cialized recognition and why it lasts longer then the stimuli that make it work.
One of the key points in “My favourite things” is repetition. Already the origi-
nal melody is widely based on the effect of repetition and serial enumeration. 
In repeating the central themes of the melody, Coltrane is even more radical in 
using this iterative principle, building the fascinating tension of his piece by a 
continuous oscillation between repetition and variation.
I would like to stress the general point of this argument in a twofold way: 
First I would argue that repetition and recognition are key-issues not only in “My 
favourite things” but in music in general. Music without repetition and recog-
nition would just be noise. And: Music that is just repetition and recognition 
without any variation is nothing but boring, pimba as we call it in Portuguese. 
Patrick Colm Hogan has built up an interesting Guide for Humanists to Cogni-
tive Science, Literature, and the Arts (Holms 2003), precisely starting with John 
Coltrane’s example. The point is that the effect of repetition and recognition 
is not only structurally relevant for music: it is for cognition at all. Our brain is 
constructed in a way that the cultural environment that it is exposed to shapes 
and sets up the structure through which the brain will attend the environment, 
trying to develop and maintain a coherent correspondence between the mental 
structure and the world experienced outside. This is valid not only in a short 
term perspective like priming your attention to my arguments through a musical 
experience. Instead it stands for the general plasticity of our brain, as shown 
in chapter I.
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One of the simplest ways of shaping structures is repetition. A repeated 
input will cause the notion of familiarity that by itself will lead to a certain agree-
ment between the inner mental world and the world outside. That what one 
sees, hears and feels first and repeatedly, will have a lasting impact on what 
one thinks and what one likes. In his book on The Hidden Forces That Shape 
Our Decisions, Dan Ariely asks himself and the reader:
Could it be that we made arbitrary decisions at some point in the past (like the 
goslings that adopted Lorenz as their parent) and have built our lives on them 
ever since, assuming that the original decisions were wise? Is that how we cho-
se our careers, our spouses, the clothes we wear, and the way we style our hair? 
Were they smart decisions in the first place? Or were they partially random first 
imprints that have run wild? (Ariely 2009, loc. 861-864)
And further in his book: “Perhaps it’s time to inventory th[ese] imprints and 
anchors in our own life.” (Ariely 2009, loc. 879). 
This is the issue of tacit knowledge. Maybe our inclination to music (a quite 
useless thing, by the way) has to do with this “tacit power” of experiencing the 
interaction of repetition, melody or structure shaping and variation. As your 
music expectation is anchored by referring to a certain theme, chord or tonality, 
our brain is anchored to certain experience-based structures that aim at main-
taining themselves through variation. In music we experience this interaction of 
repetition and variation as such – without any further reference (that is why we 
practice music without having any practical interest).
Another important point is that our brain selects certain stimuli and lets 
them make sense, while others are not attended. When you are listening to 
music you don’t even hear you neighbour snore. Our brain does the same: 
such stimuli that do not find correspondence in your mental structure are rolled 
out, neglected or forgotten. You even do not notice that they are there (but your 
neighbour might, as he is sleeping and thus in a different structure than you). 
Bruce Wexler writes:
Such processes are so common that they seem only natural, and the excess of 
input beyond processing capacity makes them necessary. Two points, however, 
are of current relevance. First, since these internal structures select and value 
sensory input that is consistent with them, they create an exaggerated sense 
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of agreement between the internal and external worlds. Second, since internal 
structures shape perceptual experience to be consistent with the structures 
themselves, they limit further alteration of brain structure by environmental input. 
(Wexler 2006: 155)
Tacit knowledge emerges from the permanent effort of our brain to find a 
proximal relation between its own structure and its environment. Even distance 
is a means to shape proximity, in the sense that it establishes such relation. 
Therefore, distance and proximity are not opposed in a cognitive sense, as 
both describe a relation to the self. Distance not linked to the self would not 
make any sense. Distress and conflict emerge, instead, when no relation can 
be established from the individual brain to its environment. Thus, the opposite 
of proximity would be displacement.
So far, we have used two terms to describe the phenomenon that we are 
dealing with: imprinting and anchoring, two metaphors that try to describe how 
the environment acts upon our mind and shapes its structure in a way that is 
unknown to us but relevant to all we know. This is what I call tacit knowledge, 
first defined by Michael Polanyi in the famous sentence: “We can know more 
than we can tell” (Polanyi 2009: 4).
In the following, I will present some further kind of tacit knowledge deriving 
from the basic principle described before, trying to show the importance of this 
term to distinguish between proximity and displacement.
A certain type of tacit knowledge might be found in what Richard Nisbett 
called a Geography of Thought (Nisbett 2003). The basic point in this geog-
raphy of thought is the observation again, that cultural environment plays a 
certain role in the way we think. Nisbettʼs main thesis is “that indoctrination 
into distinctive habits of thought from birth could result in very large cultural 
differences in habits of thought” (Nisbett 2003, xvi). His findings seem to 
prove that mind did not just develop evolutionarily and thus as the same for all 
mankind, but that geographical, social and cultural conditions lead to different 
practices and beliefs and thus to different kinds of thinking, individually, in the 
scope of a lifetime; collectively, in the form of different cultures. His argument 
is a long-term one, but still it is not in the sense of evolution, but of history. 
The main difference he tries to prove occurs between “Asians” and “Western-
ers”, namely based on the distinction between classical China and classical 
Greece. “The ecologies of ancient Greece and China were drastically different 
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– in ways that led to different economic, political, and social arrangements.” 
(Nisbett 2003: 32) 
Focusing on different things will produce different understandings about the 
nature of the world. Different worldviews will in turn reinforce differential atten-
tion and social practices. The different worldviews will also prompt differences 
in perception and reasoning processes – which will tend to reinforce world-
views. (Nisbett 2003: 38) 
I do not want to discuss now whether the differences pointed out for 
Westerners and Asians are convincing or not. But it seems quite clear that 
Nisbett’s theory highlights the importance of the environment for the way we 
think. We are familiar with this finding in two other circumstances. The first 
point is history – or what we might call a non-evolutionary evolution of men-
tal processes. I argue that it is worthwhile to look at cognition not only in its 
structural conditions but in its concrete historical establishment. We could 
then recover such concepts like ‘Discourse’ in the sense of Michel Foucault, 
‘paradigm’ in the sense of Thomas Kuhn or ‘Denkstil’ and ‘Denkkollektiv’ in 
the sense of Ludwik Fleck as specific forms of proximity built up by certain 
groups in time. We could consider those concepts as the historical estab-
lishment of a tacit knowledge assuring proximity to those who are in and 
displacement to those who are not. 
But let me come back to a second point that is much more closely re-
lated to the question of geography of thought and thus to the construction 
of cultural proximity. Quoting Nisbett before, I used a word as polemical as 
Discourse, Paradigm and Denkstil. I am referring to the word “mentality” or 
“mentalities”. Again, I would like to ask: What is the cognitive status of men-
tality? Is it just an airy idea or is there something behind that could account 
for a condition for cognitive processes? Riccardo Viale and Andrea Pozzali 
who have studied the “Cognitive Aspects of Tacit Knowledge and Cultural 
Diversity”, actually claim that in addition to the universal principles, “the child 
also assimilates culture-based schemes and principles that determine the 
development of cognitive styles valid only at local level” (Viale & Pozzali 2007: 
238). Those cultural-based schemes and principles give “rise to profound 
differences between various cultural areas in terms of the cognitive style” in 
what they call “Implicit Cognitive Rules”. 
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This is the point where applied sciences like Intercultural Management 
start their research. Let me just give one example, maybe the most striking 
and most famous one: Geert Hofstede’s research on international differences 
in work-related values, which was mentioned in the previous chapter. One of 
his recent books speaks of Cultures and Organizations as the Software of the 
Mind (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Of course, Hofstede’s work is not cogni-
tive research – it is mainly based on statistics and inquiries in the context of 
multinational corporations. But his research reveals interesting data exactly on 
the issue of cultural motivated differences in the way people think – differences 
that might even be measurable. Though the statistic finding does not prove 
any evidence on cognitive processes, it might help to indicate where we have 
to look for such differences in the way people think and act. Maybe we should 
have some doubts on the national approach behind his research – and maybe 
we are not willing to accept his idea that national ways of thinking and national 
values “should be considered given facts, as hard as a country´s geographic 
position or its weather” (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005: 13). But the dimensions of 
national cultures he studies could be a short description of the areas in which 
tacit knowledge is particularly relevant. These dimensions are the following: the 
indexes of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance 
and Long- or Short-Term-Orientation. The point that Hofstede tries to make, 
is that people think and act differently in or better on the basis of these issues. 
The “software of the mind” works differently if a certain index is higher or lower 
– leading to different outcomes and realities. Tacit knowledge in the sense of 
mentalities seems to work efficiently in the area of power (and resistance), in 
the struggle between Individualism and Collectivism, in gender questions, time-
projection (as concerning memory and future projects) and when certainty and 
uncertainty are at stake. I would suggest that we should take these statistic 
findings seriously, because they describe a quite widespread area of differ-
ences in thinking and behaviour that are broader than the individual and smaller 
than mankind, defining a proximity that each individual may not be aware of.
But there is one important point, as I said before, where we should doubt 
Hofstede’s research, namely in his tacit apology of national differences. 
 Hofstede’s research dates from the late 1970s and that means that his data 
is quite out of date – in spite of recent research undertaken to confirm the 
former findings. Some thirty years further in the process of globalization na-
tional differences somehow seem to vanish. Today’s culture seems much more 
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determined by hybridism and liquidity then by any certainty. Following Zygmunt 
Bauman we may characterize our contemporary culture by “the ‘overvaluation’ 
[…] of the individual liberated from the constraints imposed by a dense network 
of social bonds” (Bauman 2004: 96). But this liberation causes a new challenge 
to the individual: an increasing mismatch between the acquired mental struc-
tures and the hybrid environment. A huge amount of “incongruities introduced 
by significant changes in the environment, produce distress and dysfunction”, 
as Bruce Wexler (Wexler 2006: 170) argues. This is especially relevant for emi-
grants, as Wexler explains: 
Even when they make the effort, their neurobiological development is out of syn-
chrony with the opportunities for skill and role development in the new culture. 
There is no match in their new environments for the knowledge and skills they 
developed in their original environments. (Wexler 2006: 236)
Somehow like the difference between noise and music, the mismatch be-
tween mind structure and environment means a challenge that might not be 
easy to act on: displacement. 
Also new media and their challenges to the concept of identity stimulate a 
new view on tacit knowledge. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin argue that 
the ‘windowed style’ of World Wide Web “privileges fragmentation, indetermi-
nacy, and heterogeneity” (Bolter & Grusin 2000, 31) and “that the unity of our 
selves is fractured” (Bolter & Grusin 2000: 257) by the media culture in which 
we live. The “remediated”, the “virtual”, the “networked” Self are three main 
forms how digital media reshape our culture’s definitions of the self. The so- 
-called “Second life” is an ultimate attempt to separate body, mind and world 
in autonomous entities sent out on their own. My avatar moves through the 
virtual world and his own appearance as a well-defined body can even coun-
teract all what I am in real world: I can be thick or thin, tall or small, brave or 
coward – and even male or female. Imagine, my female avatar looking for a fe-
male fitness-studio in “Second life”. What should I answer then, when another 
avatar asks me: “But are you really a woman?” (Bolter & Grusin 2000: 263). 
The argument is deep in two senses: first, because we can virtually separate 
body and mind in a way that my separated body is exposed to experiences 
that my real body-mind-unit never could achieve. The point is that there is no 
mind at all in virtual reality; my avatar is without mind – and thus without tacit 
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knowledge. Is there any proximity in second live? Isn’t second live the institu-
tionalization of displacement? Tacit knowledge – and that is the second sense 
– is, where I am really not a woman – and I am referring to gender, not to sex 
which would be just a body question that my avatar might answer on his or her 
own. As nation and identity my Self is in trouble: hybrid, fluid, remediated: as if 
it were “not concerned to give a faithful or consistent representation” (Bolter & 
Grusin 2000: 265) of itself.
The point is that this tacit conditioning of all my thinking is not just accidental 
and arbitrary. On the contrary: it is based on a general principle and a specific 
set of cultural configurations. The principle has been described by Leonard 
Talmy in the fore-mentioned theory towards a cognitive semantics. As quoted 
before, Talmy’s main argument is “that there has evolved in the human species 
an innately determined brain system whose principal function is the acquisition, 
exercise, and imparting of culture” (Talmy 2003: II, 373). This so-called Cogni-
tive Culture System “directs the individual, particularly the developing child, 
to preferentially attend to and observe certain aspects of the behaviour of the 
people most directly interacting with that individual, and to assess these ob-
servations for certain kinds of regularities, patterns, and norms” (Talmy 2003: II, 
378f.). Further on in life, the “cognitive culture system can conclude that there 
are incompatibilities or conflicts between the patterns in two or more different 
groups assessed as relevant to the self” (Talmy 2003: II, 380), so that it might 
resolve “focusing on one pattern to the relative exclusion of the other patterns, 
developing a distinctive blend of two or more of the patterns, and develop-
ing psychologically compartmentalized forms of each of the patterns” (Talmy 
2003: II, 381). But there is one thing that the cognitive culture system cannot 
do: it cannot abstain from the development of patterns and norms. You can be 
against certain patterns or norms, but you will need other patterns and norms 
to do so. And certainly, you can change your mind concerning certain patterns 
and norms but you will do it on the basis of other patterns and norms. And nor-
mally you will simply not know which patterns and norms you are referring to, 
because they seem so natural to you that you would take them to be universal 
right and reason. 
But culture, patterns and norms are not universal and they cannot be taken 
for granted. They are – as Talmy showed – a matter of “acquisition, exercise, 
and imparting”. Culture is not for granted: it is a matter of sharing experiences 
and intentions, and a matter of learning and teaching. That is why culture can 
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be changed, that is why culture can be lost, and that is why we need to know 
more about its tacit power on our thinking and acting. 
“My Favourite Things” – the tacit knowledge, next to me and connecting me 
to my environment: I have already mentioned how perception and conception 
work together in the way we think. For this intimate relation between percep-
tion and conception, Leonard Talmy suggested the intuitive term of “ception” 
(Talmy 2003: I, 139-175). Ception counts on the inseparable relation between 
what happens in our brain (through the stimuli given by eyes, ears and other 
notions) and the world constituted as such which is simultaneously the origin of 
the stimuli. Ception is where proximity and distance build an inseparable unit. 
In this sense, a certain “transposition of meaning away from us” (Polanyi 2009: 
14) is present to some extent in all tacit knowing. That is why Polanyi writes 
that “wherever some process in our body gives rise to consciousness in us, 
our tacit knowing of the process will make sense of it in terms of an experience 
to which we are attending” (Polanyi 2009: 15). And further: “[…] the process 
of education by which the human mind is brought into existence is a major 
exercise of these powers of understanding. The growing mind recreates the 
whole conceptual framework and all the rules of reasoning bequeathed to it by 
its culture.” (Polanyi 2009: 45f.)
This recreation of the conceptual framework and rules of reasoning will es-
tablish a certain way of thinking – and it will be present in further ceptions, 
experiences, understandings, adjustments, decisions and acts. Once again: 
the argument does not want to claim the idea of a static determinism or an 
unchangeable fate. But it wants to emphasize the relatedness and embed-
dedness of our thinking concerning the tacit conceptual frameworks and rules 
established by culture and through education. 
Tacit knowledge is the knowledge next to me that I even do not recognize 
as being knowledge at all. It is the structure shaped by education and former 
experience that makes up my mind and that I try to bring in correspondence 
with the new experiences that I make. Try to forget it – you will not be able to. 
As you are not able to forget “My favourite things”.
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Chapter III
Warburg and Jolles: a cognitive approach  
to the art of viewing and the art of reading
The following reflection is based on two assumptions that might be controver-
sial. The first assumption is about Pathosformel [pathos formula] and Sprach-
gebärde [language gesture], the two fundamental terms in Warburg’s art of 
viewing art, who first used the term in his 1906 writing on Dürer and the Italian 
antiquity (Warburg 1992), and in André Jolles’ art of reading literature, devel-
oped mainly in his book on Einfache Formen from 1930. My first thesis is that 
these two terms can be compared and that they – phenomenologically taken 
– refer to the same concept. In further research this reflection might even be 
extended to Panofskyʼs concept of “type” and to Ernst Robert Curtius’ notion 
of “topos”.5 My second and main thesis is that this concept can be explained 
(and explored) by some of the recent theories developed in Cognitive Studies. 
In this sense I will simultaneously deal with Warburg and apply a Warburgian 
interest in joining insights from the so-called Culture Studies and the so-called 
sciences.
The interesting point about Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde is that they 
seem to exist before concretization in the arts and even before their concrete 
meaning. Oscillating between a morphological pre-existence and its meaningful 
appearance, their floating experience is a challenge both to history and eter-
nity, to universalism and cultural relativism. Whenever one deals with Warburg’s 
famous Mnemosyne-Atlas-Project one can observe this challenge in action: 
The fact that the project is only bequeathed in vague drafts and ambiguous 
5 From the perspective of a methodological challenge, a comparison of Pathosformel, Topos 
and Type has been developed by Pfisterer (2003). See also the fundamental findings in Wuttke 
(1996).
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representations only highlights the permanent entanglement of its observer 
between “I do not really understand what it means” and “There is something 
about it”. 
Intuitiveness as the anticipation of its meaning is what really delights our 
interest in Jolles and Warburg and their concepts of Sprachgebärde and 
Pathosformel. I will try to offer now some theoretical approaches from cognitive 
studies that might help us understand both: the terms Sprachgebärde and 
Pathosformel, as well as our interest in them.
The first concept that must be mentioned is the concept of schemas and 
scripts, which Ernst H. Gombrich referred to in his Art and Illusion even before 
the cognitive turn that we are suggesting (Ettlinger 1992: 510). Schemas allow 
us to establish a meaningful contextual knowledge in a given situation, which 
means recognizing a single occurrence in its contextual relatedness. Schemas 
exist before the given experience and help us organize our perception, under-
standing and behaviour. But schemas are grounded on experience as well and 
are thus permanently modelled and changed. We count on schemas to make 
sense of the world, but we do not simply depend on them as an everlasting 
predestination. There can be several types of “schema management” (as  Peter 
Stockwell put it): schemas can be restructured or preserved, they can be rein-
forced or completed, disrupted or refreshed (Stockwell 2002: 80-81). But with-
out them we hardly could make sense of what we perceive and experience. 
Some schemas even develop into scripts which define a sequence of expected 
behaviours for a certain situation. Entering a coffee shop we immediately know 
how to act (looking for a table, sitting down, asking for a coffee, paying and 
leaving again), though coffees and waiters and chairs and bills may be different 
from case to case. Those who have experienced the Lisbon Café A Brasileira, 
a Wiener Kaffeehaus and an American Starbucks know that scripts have a 
very limited validity – so that we sometimes leave the coffee shop quite disap-
pointed by the coffee, the waiter, the chair or the bill. 
Art and literature widely build upon schemas and scripts – and so does our 
recognition of Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde. The fore-mentioned findings 
concerning mirror neurons might even help explain how we develop our sche-
mas and scripts by mirroring each other’s mind. The so-called “theory of mind”, 
i.e., understanding others as intentional beings, with a mental existence much 
akin to our own, depends highly on the assumption of scripts and schemas, 
which allow us to theorize in an outreaching complex manner.
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Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel would be the impetus of scripts and 
schemas unfolding as a shared and contextual meaning. As such they would 
be simultaneously stable and dynamic, universal as a principle and historical 
in their unfolding. This first cognitive description could be a step forward in the 
analysis of their sophisticated and manifold experience in art.6 There are still 
many doubts concerning theory of mind, mirror neurons and the perceptional 
and behavioural importance of schemas and scripts. But these doubts are no 
stronger than the effort to explain the mindful workings of the brain both as a 
common and an extraordinary experience.
A second theory from Cognitive Studies might suggest a further insight. 
Without contradiction to the former proposal, we might try to consider Sprach-
gebärde and Pathosformel as a way of conceptual integration, the so-called 
blending or “mental binding”, first developed by Mark Turner and Gilles 
Fauconnier in their book The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities. The theory has been widely applied to the analysis 
of metaphor, but – as the title of the book suggests – its scope is much broader. 
In our interpretation, the Pathosformel would work like a “presentation space” 
which is blended with the (representation of the) referent in a way that generates 
meaning. Again, we could count on a certain stability, continuity and recognition 
on the one hand, as we could experience on the other hand singularity and in-
novation. Following a later development of conceptual blending (s. chapter VI) 
we could imagine a relevance space working in the process itself, once again 
like an orientation towards restructuring, preservation, reinforcement, refine-
ment, disruption or refreshment. Observing the concrete case of Dürer’s “Tod 
des Orpheus”, we might understand how the antique tradition and the mod-
ern vision worked together in Dürer’s art. By joining the two attributes given by 
 Warburg himself to the Pathosformel (“lebenskräftig”; full of life) and to Dürer’s 
own position in painting (“bodenständig”; down-to-earth), we acknowledge the 
process of conceptual integration as a concrete moment in history: Pathos-
formel and Dürer’s own position merge in the reinforced blend that gives rise to 
what we call the Renaissance. The blend would be what Warburg himself called 
the Einverseelung, (Warburg 2008: 3), a mental assimilation (figure 1).
6 Neuroaesthetics is the new discipline linking the long tradition of empathy in art theory to the 
observation of cognitive processes as in the case of mirror neurons. Such discussion must neces-
sarily refer to Warburg's Pathosformel, as do David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese (2007: 75).




To understand the same procedure for the term Sprachgebärde, one can 
observe in figure 2 how the life and death of Mr. X is transformed through the 
presentation as a Sprachgebärde of virtue and wonder. The resulting blend 
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In both cases the conceptual integration of a given presentation space and 
a new reference space results in a concrete meaning. Just as there would 
be no legend without Mr. X and no saint without the Sprachgebärde of virtue 
and wonder, there would be no Renaissance without Dürer’s painting and the 
Pathosformel reinforced by it. The process that we described is the way it 
makes sense, both for the author or painter and for us, who just receive the 
message for understanding.
In both cases I suggested that Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel are prior 
to the case or to its concrete experience. The same must be true for schemas 
and scripts that we identified as a first cognitive concept relevant for those 
terms. This allows me to ask now where Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel 
may come from. If they are prior to the case and to the concrete experience, 
where might they come from, where might they be at home? Are they univer-
sals or archetypes (as often suggested) that exist as an a priori transcendent 
category? From the point of view of rhetoric, Joachim Knape has discussed the 
meaning of Pathosformel and rejected clearly any significance in the use of the 
term based on the idea of a universal set of signs or archetypes (Knape 2008: 
123, 129). For Warburg, Pathosformel seems to be less a rhetoric sign (Knape 
2008: 131) than a vestige within what Knape calls the code of the European 
community of visual communication (der europäischen Bildkommunikationsge-
meinschaft; Knape 2008: 135). What does that mean? Might this help explain 
why certain Pathosformeln could have been lost somehow in the Middle Ages – 
as Warburg suggests? Or how could they come to an end – as Jolles states for 
the legend of saints (though he recognizes that they found their “renaissance” 
in the sports pages of today’s newspapers)? 
I would like to propose an answer in two steps. First, I would like to refer 
to what Leonard Talmy called the “Cognitive Culture System” that has been 
explored in chapter I. Talmy provides evidence for his thesis that “culture is a 
highly organized cognitive construction, and that little in cognition of such a 
complex and systematic character ‘just happens’ without specific neural provi-
sion for it”. This cognitive culture system is acquired in infancy, then turns out 
to be quite stable through lifelong exercise and is continuously handed down 
to the following generation. As we attempt to establish congruency between 
our conception of the world and the world we live in, incongruities between the 
environment and the developed brain, incongruities introduced, for example, 
by significant changes in the environment, produce distress and dysfunction 
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(Wexler 2006: 170). Through our cognitive culture system, we stick to “certain 
kinds of regularities, patterns, and norms” (Talmy 2003: 379) by which we ex-
perience the world and develop meaning. 
Talmy refers to the famous list of 72 cultural universals proposed by George 
Peter Murdock in 1965 as the general framework through which culture 
emerges. Among the 72 universals we find cosmology and courtship as well as 
hair-styles and hospitality or sexual restrictions and soul concepts, just to give 
six examples in their original alphabetical context (Talmy 2003: 376). But we 
do not find Sprachgebärde or Pathosformel, because they are not universal in 
the sense of Murdock’s list. Nevertheless, they are part of the cognitive culture 
system developed along our history in its concrete “regularities, patterns, and 
norms”. As such they are a cognitive entity, prior to the concrete experience, 
but dependent on its acquisition, exercise and imparting. This might explain 
how the Pathosformel could have gone lost and be rediscovered again, why 
Sprachgebärden can die and then rise again. Certain “means of transmission”7 
guarantee their survival – though they might be “concealed” by other artefacts 
or cultural strata as Warburg explains in his introduction to the Mnemosyne-
Atlas (Warburg 2008: 5). It mainly explains why we can share the notion of 
Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel and why they can work meaningfully as 
schemas and in conceptual integration, not as a genetic heritage but as a 
cultural experience renewable through continuous acquisition. The cognitive 
culture system is universal as a human condition, but it is necessarily historical 
in its actuality. Or in other words: We are cultural by nature. That is why Dieter 
Wuttke’s suggestion that Culture Studies (he speaks of Geisteswissenschaft) 
should be the science of the historical world is a necessary reorientation in an 
artificially divided culture (Wuttke 2002: 58). And thus, Cognitive Studies as a 
reductive neuro- and brain science could never achieve an adequate insight 
about the historical process of mind and meaning.
I would like to consider a second cognitive model that might help us de-
scribe the challenge even more clearly. Figure 3 presents a simplified summary 
of the “Architecture of Semantic Domains”, developed by Per Aage Brandt 
(2004). 
7 I borrow the term from Gertud Bing in Wuttke (1996: 684).
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Figure 3 – The Architecture of Semantic Domains
In the centre of the diagram you find the four basic semantic domains (the 
physical, social, mental and speech-act domains), surrounded by twelve satel-
lite domains. In a first orbit we find the practical domains (work, love and wor-
ship). A second orbit based on exchange establishes economy (exchanging 
things), jurisdiction (exchanging acts) and aesthetics (exchanging signs). As a 
third orbit we find the discourses of description, argumentation and narration 
that establish finally three domains of knowledge in science, philosophy, and 
history. 
I will not discuss this architecture now – and I even do not want to suggest 
it as the final word on the structure of our semantic domains. I would like to use 
this structure just for the purpose of clarifying where Pathosformel and Sprach-
gebärde are – metaphorically speaking – at home. Here we come to some 
interesting findings. First, we recognize that Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde 
seem to be at home in the so-called domain of aesthetics since they are mainly 
determined by the exchange of signs. In the case of Sprachgebärde we rec-
ognize its deep foundation in the speech-act domain, while the Pathosformel 















4 =  speech-act
5 = polis (work)
6 = oikos (love)




11 = descriptive discourse
12 = argumentative discourse
13 =  narrative discourse
14 = science knowledge
15 = philosophy knowledge
16 = history knowledge
theatre
The Architecture of Semantic Domains
Based on: Per Aage Brandt, Spaces, Domains and Meaning. 
Essays in Cognitive Semiotics. Bern etc.: Lang 2004.
Figure 3
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Anyway, what is most striking about such observation is the fact that it does 
not fully satisfy a characterization of what Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde 
are about. And this second finding can help us understand why the cognitive 
description of their meaning is a complex endeavour: the interesting point in 
Pathosformel and Sprachgebärde is not where they are at home and what they 
mean in terms of semantic determination. On the contrary, Sprachgebärde and 
Pathosformel are ways of connecting domains of meaning and thus ways by 
which meaning is performed. Instead of situating Sprachgebärde and Pathos-
formel in an “Architecture of Semantic Domains”, we should try to describe 
ways and forms of interacting and performing semantic structures. Or express-
ing this finding even more radically: Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel do not 
mean anything; they are just ways of performing meaning. It is their performa-
tive character that Warburg emphasizes in the task of representing “menschlich 
bewegtes Leben”, humanly moved life, as he explains in the introduction to the 
Mnemosyne project (Warburg 2008: 6). The representation of humanly moved 
life leads Warburg necessarily to merge the ontological, the biological, the psy-
chological and the point of view of fine arts.8
I would like to draw two conclusions from this observation. The first is that 
we might need to develop a new kind of cognitive architecture, not searching 
for meaning and semantic determination, but trying to describe cognitive forms 
of interacting and performing semantic domains. Instead of observing what 
one thinks, the question would be how one thinks. Not insisting on the content 
of meaning but on the ways and forms of its appearance. In the same way 
that Murdock’s list cannot account for Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel, an 
“Architecture of Semantic Domains” does not provide the essential elements 
to describe them. Again: we already know a lot about the content of an “Ar-
chitecture of Semantic Domains” and about the content of a culture cognitive 
system as described by Talmy. Murdock’s list would be a kind of general lexicon 
of the culture cognitive system, varied by each culture in concrete forms. But 
we know very little about a general grammar of this system that determines the 
way in which the lexicon is performed. Ways of thinking – instead of contents of 
meaning, that is what Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel are about.
8 As Knape (2008:124) pointed out, inviting to a critical evaluation of Warburg's attempt.
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Using the metaphors of lexicon and grammar reveals how much of what 
Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel adhere to depends on cultural variety. As 
the lexicon, grammar is culturally determined. Thus, the second point to con-
clude from this observation is that Sprachgebärde and Pathosformel belong to 
what we started to describe in then previous chapter as tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is a term that we borrowed from Michael Polanyi and his famous 
thesis that “we know more than we can tell”. Even though our research on tacit 
knowledge has only started and therefore has given rise to more questions 
than to any answers and still less to any certainty, we might agree beforehand 
that there is some tacit dimension in the way we think and that this tacit dimen-
sion is culturally imparted and shared. A Pathosformel would be a tacit way 
of representing humanly moved life, as Sprachgebärde would be a tacit kind 
of expression, both being culturally determined. In tacit knowledge, cognitive 
principles meet history as their cultural concretization. We do not have any cog-
nitive principles without their cultural concretization and no cultural processes 
that are not based on the cognitive principles. In tacit knowledge, nature and 
nurture meet necessarily. 
I imagine Warburg’s library as the archive of tacit knowledge, and if it were 
able to speak, we would certainly know more about the way we think. If one 
could identify the coordinates in Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas we would get a 
veritable map to tacit knowledge that would not only identify semantic domains 
but mainly the way they are linked together. A cognitive science seeking for 
the conditions and the performance of tacit knowledge will find in Warburg’s 
and Jolles’ work an identical interest: to find out not what, but how we think, 
view and speak, describing ways of blending, identifying scripts and schemas, 
naming patterns, rules and norms and recognizing the dynamic relation in the 
way they perform across semantic domains by building up cognitive culture 
systems smaller than mankind but embracing more than the individual. 
The project would actually be a science of culture. And even before we 
can start to explore it further, we recognize immediately that this tacit knowl-
edge is as powerful9 as it is fragile. As tacit knowledge, Pathosformeln and 
9 Karl Sierek (2012) has given a systematic approach to iconic energy that seems to cover 
quite well the function of Pathosformel as tacit knowledge, mainly in what he calls the "orientational 
functions of the image".
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Sprachgebärden must be acquired, must be practiced and imparted. That is 
what culture is about. That is why we care about the art of viewing and the art 
of reading. At risk always. Lost and re-found. That is why Mnemosyne is as 
much the goddess of the past as the guide to the future.
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Chapter IV
Long waves or vanishing points?  
A cognitive approach to the literary construction  
of history
In the following chapter I will try to present four theses. The first thesis dis-
cusses two monumental works as turning points of German post-war literature. 
The second thesis – intertwined with the first – tries to show which cognitive 
concept of force-dynamics in history characterizes each of the works. We will 
briefly analyse the first paragraph of each of them to identify in which sense 
(third thesis) the texts establish their own limits and settings right from the be-
ginning, creating a tacit condition of the framework within which the further 
development of the text can take place. Finally (fourth thesis), we will explain 
in which sense our findings might help to understand the fact that the novels 
lost their status of turning points after 1989. We might ask what is wrong in the 
concept of force-dynamics that characterizes each of the two works – and that 
seems not be adequate to the needs and interests of readers after 1989. 
There are two more theses behind my argument that I should mention 
though I am not going to unfold them. The first is that we can apply theories of 
cognitive semiotics to understanding how novels and literature in general work 
and how they organize their force-dynamics structure in which turning points 
and processes (in a narrative sense) are supposed to make sense. And second, 
that such analyses might not just say something about literature but that this 
saying might be relevant for describing cultural and social changes or turning 
points (in the sense of History). But those two theses just build the tacit ground 
of my argument. I only mention them to give the reader a fair insight on my own 
limitations.
The first thesis within those limits is that two monumental works can be 
considered as turning points of German post-war literature, two outstanding 
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monuments of an attempt to understand the present through a deep reflection 
about the past (as Ralf Schnell pointed out in his History of Literature in the 
Federal Republic of Germany; Schnell 1986: 341).10 I am talking about Uwe 
Johnson’s Jahrestage and Peter Weiss’ Die Ästhetik des Widerstands. 
Uwe Johnson’s Jahrestage (Anniversaries. From the Life of Gesine 
Cresspahl) was published in four volumes; the first appeared in 1970, the sec-
ond in 1971, the third in 1973 and the last one only in 1983 (Johnson 1988). 
In 2000 Margarethe von Trotta launched an impressive film version of the book 
that I will not consider here. The English translation that I will use for quotation 
is based on a cut version prepared by Johnson himself and published before 
the last volume appeared (Johnson 1975). The book is a complex text built up 
like a diary written between August 21 in 1967 and August 20 in 1968. But the 
story covers much more than just one year. It tells us about Gesine Cresspahl’s 
life, her family and friends, reaching out from the fictive city of Jerichow in 
Mecklenburg, East Germany, where she lived the times of the Nazi Regime and 
up to the moment when she left the German Democratic Republic and settled 
first in the Federal Republic and then (after 1961) in the United States. The book 
ends on the day when Gesine is flying for business to Prague, still unaware that 
Soviet tanks have occupied the city and put down the so-called Prague Spring. 
Gesine’s reflections, her memories, the fictive dialogs with other figures like her 
father, her daughter, New York citizens or even the author himself (“Who’s tell-
ing this story, Gesine?” the text once asks. “We both are. Surely that’s obvious, 
Johnson.” is the answer; Johnson 1975: 169).11 And together with those voices 
we read others from historical documents or articles of the New York Times. 
It is not possible even to summarize one of the endless strands of the nearly 
2000 pages, but it might be clear how much these Anniversaries are a liter-
ary representation of the 20th century’s challenges, conflicts and catastrophes: 
from war, Nazism, and Anti-Semitism to the East-West conflict, racism and the 
Vietnam war. When the four volumes were finally finished, Germany seemed to 
have found a singular literary work representing those challenges, conflicts and 
10 The comparison between Weiss and Johnson has been further developed by Hofmann 
1995, Honold 2002, Knoche 2002, Pflugmacher 2007 and Rector 2005.
11 "Wer erzählt hier eigentlich, Gesine. Wir beide. Das hörst du doch, Johnson." (Johnson 
1988: I, 256)
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catastrophes that characterized contemporary culture. Thus, Jahrestage was 
celebrated as an outstanding turning point in understanding through literature 
the course of history. Johnson was considered an exceptional writer who man-
aged to intertwine East and West perspectives and stories. 
Let us have a closer look now at the beginning of the text (you will recognize 
some words from the introduction to this volume), where the main concept of 
history further developed in the novel is first presented.
Long waves sweep slanting against the beach, hump muscled backs, raise trem-
bling combs that tip over at the greenest summit. The taut roll, already streaked 
with white, enfolds a hollow space of air that is crushed by the clear mass as 
if a secret had been created and destroyed there. The bursting wave knocks 
children off their feet, whirls them around, drags them flat over the gravelly bot-
tom. Beyond the surf the waves tug at the swimmer, pulling her on outstretched 
hands over their backs. The wind is only a flutter, with a wind as slack as this the 
Baltic had petered out in a ripple. The word for the short waves of the Baltic was 
choppity. (Johnson 1975: 3)12
The very first sentence of the text introduces movement: “Long waves 
sweep slanting against the beach”, a movement that seems to occur as such, 
presenting an agonist in action. Let me translate my statements into the figures 
suggested by Leonard Talmy as instruments to identify and describe force-
dynamic patterns in language and cognition (Talmy 2003: 409-470). Here we 
have our agonist (the long waves) in action. 
12 "Lange Wellen treiben schräg gegen den Strand, wölben Buckel mit Muskelsträngen, heben 
zitternde Kämme, die im grünsten Strand kippen. Der straffe Überschlag, schon weißlich gestriemt, 
umwickelt einen runden Hohlraum Luft, der von der klaren Masse zerdrückt wird, als sei da ein Ge-
heimnis gemacht und zerstört worden. Die zerplatzende Woge stößt Kinder von den Füßen, wirbelt 
sie rundum, zerrt sie flach über den graupligen Grund. Jenseits der Brandung ziehen die Wellen die 
Schwimmende an ausgestreckten Händen über ihren Rücken. Der Wind ist flatterig. bei solchem 
drucklosen Wind ist die Ostsee in ein Plätschern ausgelaufen. Das Wort für die kurzen Wellen der 
Ostsee ist kabbelig gewesen." (Johnson 1988: I, 7)




The following lines of Johnson’s text describe the inner logic of this action 
as a complex process of force-dynamics. The waves go ahead by “raising” 
and “tipping over”, a top-down movement included in the forward action. This 
same movement is simultaneously presented as a creation of space (“a hollow 
space”) which is crushed again by the same movement. The simple cadence 
of the waves includes, thus, a three-dimensional opening and destruction of 
space, untenable in time. A comparison blends this untenable space with the 
concept of secret – an aspect that we cannot deal with at this moment. Only 
after creating and presenting the inner complexity of the waves as space and 
movement in time, do we finally see the force-dynamic effect of it: “The bursting 
wave knocks children off their feet”:
Figure 2
Again, this knocking off is not just a simple action, it is complex in the way 
that it “whirls them around, drags them flat over the gravelly bottom”. These 
actions are elaborations of the previous schema.
Agonist: long waves




a) “Long waves sweep slanting against the beach”
>
+
Agonist: the waves Antagonist: children




b) The bursting wave knocks children off their feet.
Antagonist: children
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   52 10/05/18   13:48
Long waves or vanishing points?
53
But there is still another action caused by the waves “beyond the surf”, 
when they simply pull the swimmer over their backs, not causing any destruc-
tion or confusion. Outstretched hands guarantee the swimmer’s stability:
Figure 3
The outcome of the waves’ activity is not certain: it can “knock off” or just 
“pull over”, which seems to be a question of position. 
Finally, the text introduces a new agonist, the wind, giving rise to a second 
comparison, namely to the Baltic Sea and – as indicated by the past tense – to 
former times and former words and languages. This blending of space, time 
and language is a meaningful indicator of the complexity in the novel’s struc-
ture – but I will not explore its meaning now. I prefer to ask one last question 
concerning the force-dynamics presented in these opening lines of the text: Is 
it the wind that causes the long waves? Would it be true to describe the real 
force-dynamic behind the sweeping of the long waves as the result of an ago-




Agonist: the waves Antagonist: swimmer
c) Beyond the surf the waves tug at the swimmer, 




c) Beyond the surf the wav  tug at the swimmer,
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Is this true? And if yes, how can we explain then that the same wind causes 
short waves in the Baltic? I am not sure whether the wind causes the waves – 
nor of which sort. And the text does not give any certain hint that would allow 
the reader to reach a conclusion. As he will not know for sure whether waves 
knock off or pull over. Sometimes they knock off, somewhere they don’t. And 
though we know how complex the way they build up their force is (even inviting 
us to blend it with the creation and destruction of a secret), we neither know 
how that concrete result will come out of it nor do we know where the force 
itself comes from.
You might say now: a lot of words, just to state movement – lacking its 
explanation and all kind of expectations and predictions. But this is what 
Johnson’s Anniversaries is about: showing the movement, showing what hap-
pened, showing even the insight of the waves, coming close to what would be 
a secret – without any premature conclusion and without any affinity to predic-
tion. The novel does not try to explain what happened, it does not offer predic-
tions or fulfil expectations. Our first force dynamic relation is as provisional as 
the second one and together they lack the grounding question of whether the 
waves are moved by themselves or by any other force. And there is something 
else about waves: they follow one after another as if their force were endless. 
Without an agonist that makes them move and without an end to come, the 
long waves seem to be more a symbol of time than of history, more a symbol of 
duration than of change. We could therefore say that long waves represent the 
domain of indecision forces – maybe even of forces which cannot be under-
stood. Movement without change, movement building up and tipping down, 
knocking off and pulling over, this is the conception of force dynamics we find 
in Uwe Johnson’s Anniversaries. We might recognize its attention to complex-
ity, a complexity that refuses any short conclusion. We might call it inconclusive 
complexity.
Let us compare now these results with Peter Weiss’ The Aesthetics of Re-
sistance. Comparable to Johnson’s Jahrestage, Die Ästhetik des Widerstands 
was conceived in three volumes, published in 1975, 1978 and 1981, at about 
the same time as Johnson’s work. In nearly a thousand pages Weiss presents 
a kind of fictitious autobiography of a nameless narrator who spends his youth 
in Nazi Germany, participates in the Spanish Civil War and finally reaches exile 
in Sweden. The reader follows the narrator on this way, without actually know-
ing much about his personal life. The narrator gives instead voice to those he 
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met on his way, to his friends and fellow combatants as well as to the artists 
and heroes of the artworks he appreciates and studies. Thus, the novel turns 
out to be a history of resistance – starting on the first page with ancient Per-
gamum and the raise of the giants against the gods, through the Middle-Ages 
and the 19th century up to the end of World War II. At the same time, the novel 
is a debate on art pieces which in some way represent or reflect this history of 
resistance, searching what might be called aesthetics of the oppressed and 
their fight for freedom, exactly an Aesthetics of Resistance. As in the case of 
Jahrestage, it is not possible to account for all the details or even subjects 
dealt by Weissʼ monumental work. But we might try to understand the main 
concept of history that determines the interpretation of historical experiences in 
the world created by the narrator. 
Luckily, I can base my arguments on the fundamental study developed by 
Ana Margarida Abrantes in her book Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach 
to Peter Weiss’ Prose Work which was published in 2010. Let us look again at 
the first lines of the text – we cannot discuss the whole first paragraph because 
it is about nine pages long:
All around us the bodies rose out of the stone, crowded into groups, intertwined, 
or shattered into fragments, hinting at their shapes with a torso, a propped-up 
arm, a burst hip, a scabbed shard, always in warlike gestures, dodging, reboun-
ding, attacking, shielding themselves, stretched high or crooked, some of them 
snuffed out, but with a freestanding, forward-pressing foot, a twisted back, the 
contour of a calf harnessed into a single common motion. A gigantic wrestling, 
emerging from the grey wall, recalling a perfection, sinking back into formless-
ness. A hand, stretching from the rough ground, ready to clutch, attached to 
the shoulder across empty surface, a barked face, with yawning cracks, a wide-
-open mouth, blankly gaping eyes, the face surrounded by the flowing locks of 
the beard, the tempestuous folds of a garment, everything close to its weathered 
end and close to its origin. (Weiss 2005: 3)13
13 "Rings um uns hoben sich die Leiber aus dem Stein, zusammengedrängt zu Gruppen, 
ineinander verschlungen oder zu Fragementen zersprengt, mit einem Torso, einem aufge-stützten 
Arm, einer gebrochenen Hüfte, einem verschorften Brocken ihre Gestalt andeu-tend, immer in den 
Gebärden des Kampfs, ausweichend, zurückschnellend, angreifend, sich deckend, hochgestreckt 
oder gekrümmt, hier und da ausgelöscht, doch noch mit einem freistehenden vorgestemmten Fuß, 
einem gedrehten Rücken, der Kontur einer Wade eingespannt in eine einyige gemeinsame Bewe-
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Right in the first sentence there is an anonymous force working on the sub-
ject of the sentence: the bodies are “crowded into groups, intertwined, or shat-
tered into fragments”, an anonymous agonist working against the antagonist 
bodies:
Figure 5
As it is meaningful that the agonist keeps anonymous, it is also striking that 
his force leads to two different results: crowding or joining on the one hand and 
shattering on the other. But there is also another movement, the movement 
of the bodies themselves which “rose out of the stone” in a kind of resistance 
against the greater force of their antagonist “stone”. Developing Talmy’s pat-
terns we might imagine the scene as following:
Figure 6
gung. Ein riesiges Ringen, auftauchend aus der grauen Wand, sich erinnernd an seine Vollendung, 
zurücksinkend zur Formlosigkeit. Eine Hand, aus dem rauhen Grund gestreckt, zum Griff bereit, 
über leere Fläche hin mit der Schulter verbunden, ein zerschundnes Gesicht, mit klaffenden Rissen, 
weit geöffnetem Mund, leer starrenden Augen, umflossen von den Locken des Barts, der stürmis-
che Faltenwurf eines Gewands, alles nah seinem verwitterten Ende und nah seinem Ursprung." 
(Weiss 1991: III, 7)
Antagonist: bodiesAgonist: anonymous
a) The bodies “are crowded into groups, intertwined, or shattered into fragments.”
>
+
Agonist: anonymous Antagonist: bodies
a) The bodies “are crowded into groups, intertwined, 
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a) The bodies “are crowded into groups, intertwined, 
or shattered into fragments” 









a) The bodies “are crowded into groups, intertwined, or shattered into fragments”
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The relation between these two movements is presented as a conjunction 
of force in simultaneity: moving and being moved. As a) inverts b) the verbs 
attributed to the bodies as agonist seem to oscillate between a minor force 
(“dodging”, “crooked”, “snuffed out”) and a major one (“attacking”, “stretched 
high”, “freestanding, forward-pressing”), resisting and rendering in a continu-
ous flow of force dynamics: “always in warlike gestures” and in “a single com-
mon motion”.
The same seems to be true for the pieces of art the protagonists are observ-
ing in this scene: “the gigantic wrestling” is simultaneously “recalling a perfec-
tion” and “sinking back into formlessness”. The main idea depicted in the first 
lines is thus, as in Johnson’s work, the predominance of an anonymous force 
causing multiple effects. But other than Johnson’s, this force is counteracted 
by the movement of rising out, interrupting the course of the predominant force 
without nonetheless interrupting its further impact. We can thus follow Ana 
Margarida Abrantes in the force-dynamic model of resistance that character-
izes Weiss, concept of history (Abrantes 2010: 295):
Figure 7
As Ana Margarida Abrantes shows, there will be multiple inputs of resistance 
along the novel. But the dynamic model is always the same, as can be seen 
by the narrative dynamic model for the concept of resistance (Abrantes 2010: 
297). 
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work. 
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 295.
Figure 7
Force-dynamic model of resistance.
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work.
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 295.
dominance resistance overcoming





A person or group finds itself in a departure situation (S1), which they expect 
to continue to S1’ by the mere passing of time [a kind of vanishing point in the 
future; PH]. At some point, they face a barrier C1 which prevents them to reach 
S1’. This obstacle can be a volitional agent, who deliberates to hinder the intents 
of the agents in S1. The result is that the agent in S1, previously in a neutral con-
dition, is now headed for a crisis (S2). If this is permanent and the initial balance 
cannot be re-established, the crisis can lead to a qualitative change in the agent 
(represented by the crossing of the lower horizontal line), so that it permanently 
becomes S2 […]. In terms of the dynamics of resistance, this S2 corresponds 
to the permanent condition of oppression. C1 corresponds to the intentional 
behavior of another agent (the oppressors), who have the power to influence 
the initial condition of the persons in S1. S1 resigns and complies to its new 
condition, despite it being indeed an aggravation or unbalanced condition. An 
alternative to this development is an even more dramatic condition inflicted on 
the person in S1 by the impact suffered as it meets the barrier. The subject can 
recede to a condition from which there is no possible return: he cannot accept 
or resign to the dysphoric condition, he also is not strong enough to fight and 
overcome the barrier, and instead bounces back by the strength of the barrier 
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work. 
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 297.
Figure 8
A narrative dynamic model for the concept of resistance.
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work.
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 297.
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to a condition that is prior to S1: non-existence. […] The only possibility for the 
agent in S1 to restore its original default condition is to insist on this condition 
against the volitional force of the agent of C1. This is represented in the schema 
as a loop, by which we intend to configure the impact of the harmful barrier and 
the dynamic reaction to it by the exertion of force. Only the intended goal of S1 is 
known, namely restoring the initial condition (hence the dotted line also towards 
SI’)”. (Abrantes 2010: 297-8).
The text establishes a vanishing point in the future which will not take place 
– hence its condition of utopia. And Abrantes continues to explain how this 
concept can be understood even as a continuous process: “Resistance”, she 
writes, “implies a minimal duration: in this temporal stretch, the loop can be 
repeated in a rhythmic exertion of force, representing the recurrent actions car-
ried out by the subject in S1 to oppose the barrier. In the following diagram, 
these actions are represented by {X}, which denotes an insistence or repetition 
of the actions carried out by the persons in S1 to overcome the volitional barrier 
imposed on them by the entity in C1.”
Figure 9
In this sense, the narrative dynamic model for the concept of resistance 
turns out to be a “timeless” schema that even determines the structure of the 
narrative schema itself, as shown in the following diagram. 
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work. 
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 298.
Figure 9
A narrative dynamic model for the concept of resistance  
(multiple input of resistance against opponent barrier).
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work.
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 298.




The clue is that the continuous line of S2 in the upper part of the diagram 
portrays the permanent and repeated defeat before the stronger opponent bar-
rier C1, the result of the force dynamics, which is well known, historical and 
factual. The narrative develops its own structure as a repetition of the concept 
of resistance under the condition of permanent oppression and failure. It opens 
up a new loop whose result can be predicted as belonging to the domain of 
submission and resignation. 
You might call this quite unsatisfactory or even a contradiction. It might 
be at this point that contemporary readers do not find the answers and the 
pleasure they are looking for in Weiss’ Aesthetics of Resistance. The end 
of the East-West conflict did not only abolish the concrete historical setting 
ʻwhich Weissʼ work is imbedded in, but it even made possible an experience 
that his concept of history and force dynamics could not give account for: 
a revolution that solved a problem and provoked a thousand of new ones 
which do not obey to the concept of resistance. It seems to me that the clash 
of civilizations (if it exists) cannot be understood under the concept of resist-
ance, nor can the economic crisis, consumerism or migration or however you 
might characterize liquid modernity (Bauman 2000) and contemporary hybrid 
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work. 
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 299.
Figure 10
A narrative dynamic model for the concept of resistance: continuity between the timeless schema of 
resistance and the narrative schema of resistance in "Die Asthetik des Widerstands”.
Ana Margarida Abrantes: Meaning and Mind. A Cognitive Approach to Peter Weiss' Prose Work.
Frankfurt/M. et al.: Lang 2010 (= passagem 3), p. 299.
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cultures (Canclini 2005). Conviviality seeks a different kind of force dynamics 
(Gilroy 2004).
Readers of Weiss, book might feel that there must have been a turning point 
in-between, which provoked a worldview that does not follow the concept of 
resistance as developed in his work. And the same readers may find Johnson’s 
Anniversaries too inconclusive in the long waves of an exhausting complexity. 
Of course, both works still document a state of things and a state of mind that 
historically marked an era which they were able to portray and to represent in 
an outstanding and singular way. Both works continue to be some of the best 
literary representations of a post-war state of affairs – and as such witnesses 
of an admirable aesthetic mastery and an inestimable value in cultural memory. 
But the simplicity of one model and the undecided complexity of the other 
might not be considered as valid concepts of force dynamics in contemporary 
culture, where problems and challenges are multiple and concrete, and where 
solutions are supposed to be possible and achieved. Historical narratives of 
a divided world and timeless concepts seem to have burnt out: neither long 
waves nor vanishing points, just hard work to do. 
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Chapter V
Force dynamics: mental structures for conflict
or How Benjamin th/sought history
The following chapter attempts to continue the discussion of approaches from 
cognitive sciences as valuable contributions to Culture Studies, with the aim of 
explaining how certain ideas and conceptions in culture theory work. It is not 
a very usual way of dealing with the subject – and maybe it will cause some 
strangeness and refusal. I will refer here to two basic models in cognitive sci-
ence. The first is the fore-mentioned force dynamics, proposed by Leonard 
Talmy in his work Toward a Cognitive Semantics (Talmy 2003). I will follow his 
description of force dynamic patterns up to a certain moment, when Per Aage 
Brandt’s model (presented in the book Spaces, Domains and Meaning; Brandt 
2004) turns out to be more intuitive, accounting for the sequence of events and 
not just for a state of forces. Also, when I come to speak of the second cogni-
tive category that we need to explain our subject, I will mainly refer to the model 
of conceptual integration (blending) developed by Per Aage Brandt. 
Walter Benjamin’s work is a key reference in Culture Studies; maybe one of 
the most quoted and most admired authors of an emerging complex scientific 
field. There are thousands of books and articles on his theory and even more 
books and articles based on his theory. And within his theory, the ideas con-
cerning history are the most discussed and best explored issues, familiar to the 
whole community of Culture Studies – in a certain sense. Thus, this chapter 
seems to be somewhat superfluous – and maybe this is the friendliest charac-
terization one will give it. I have to explain what I am going to do in the next few 
pages, as well as what I am not going to do. 
First, I am not going to talk about what Benjamin thinks, I will instead focus 
on how he thinks. One should not take this distinction wrong. I think it could 
be quite helpful to take some insight of Benjamin’s thinking that might even 
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explain why we admire so much what he thinks. The advantage of studying the 
way one thinks (instead of studying what this thinking is about) is very simple: 
it guarantees that this thinking is common to us and that we can share it; the 
content of one human mind is modelled by the structures of thought and can 
be communicated and thus reconstructed by the same structures of another 
mind. Let me explain this simple statement through two very basic assump-
tions that are so elementary that we normally do not talk about them:
– We organize our thinking through a certain set of structures that are po-
tentially common to all people;
– This set of structures is neither endless nor undefined, but stable through 
diversity.
Of course, I am aware that this kind of assumption – despite being more than 
basic and simple – needs discussion, at least because we debate  Benjamin 
and other authors not because we all think the same way but because we all 
think different things. And Benjamin is in the focus of our interest not because 
he thinks the way we think, but because he thought things differently. But con-
sider for some moments that there must be a real basic link from your thinking 
to Benjamin’s because without it we could not admire him! And this link is what 
I would like to call the stable set of structures that are potentially common to 
all people. 
One element of this structure that we are going to deal with only once and 
very briefly is the structural conception of space. Where are you now? In a cer-
tain room, in a certain city and in a certain country, maybe in Europe, certainly 
in the world, on earth, in the Universe. Of course, you are there, but I am here 
in my office writing these arguments. You will find thousands of answers to the 
question about where we are, but you just have one structural conception to 
answer it: the conception of space. You would not accept an answer like “blue” 
or “smell” or “pfeifen” as a valid answer to the question. And I think that it gives 
a certain kind of peace to our life that we all know it.
There is a lot of work to do on Benjamin’s structural conception of space 
– consider only the strong acceptance that the idea of Passagen found since 
he declared it to be a favourite in modern worldview: a certain option in a stable 
set of structures.
In this sense, a few sentences from Benjamin’s ninth “Thesis on the Philoso-
phy of History” shall be submitted to the exercise of understanding how they 
are thought. Just one aspect will be taken into account, namely the conception 
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of force dynamics that Benjamin uses in order to understand and make sense 
of history. The following famous sentences will be the focus of our analysis:
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he 
is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are 
staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain 
of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; 
it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we 
call progress. (Benjamin 1999: 257-258)
There are three elements that make up Benjamin’s idea or thesis: First, there 
is the angel, the angel of history, let us call it (or him?) the (prot)agonist in this 
setting. Second, we find the storm as a blowing force, let us call it the antago-
nist, and third we have a certain movement forward in time. I think diagram 1 
(Talmy 2003: I, 414) shows quite well the basic organization of the setting. The 
sign + in the antagonist’s symbol means that the storm is stronger than the 
angel and that it can make him (or it) move – willingly or unwillingly. The action 
is symbolized by the small arrow on the line. 
Figure 1
So far we find a very simple setting that is one of the basic structures of 




Agonist: anonymous Antagonist: bodies
a) The bodies “are crowded into groups, intertwined, 





a) Theboies“are crowed into groups, intertwined, 
or shattered intofragments.” 
Figure 5
●
a) The angel moves because of the storm. 
+
>
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storm. Force-dynamics is about causing and letting, including other notions 
that are strongly related to them, such as the “general notions of ‘despite’ and 
‘although’, and such particular notions as ‘hindering’, ‘helping’, ‘leaving alone’, 
and […] ‘trying’” (Talmy 2003: I, 429). Consider shortly the three other basic 
steady-states that can be conceived in the setting (Figure 2):
Figure 2
Benjamin’s thesis would have been a completely different one if he had cho-
sen one of the other steady-state patterns. We should be aware that we leave 
out three of four patterns when we follow now the idea a).
There is nothing special in the idea of a strong storm that makes an angel 
move (despite, perhaps, the fact that angels themselves are special). What 
makes the idea special are five other elements that complete the cognitive set-
ting of the scene:
1.  “The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed”.
2.  The angel is blown forward, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward.
3. The angel sees things differently. 
4. The storm is progress.
5. And finally: a missing link (that we are going to explore later).
 
 
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   65 10/05/18   13:48
Peter Hanenberg
66
The first point is the crucial one because without it there would be no dra-
matic tension in the thesis but just interpretation. The point is that there is 
another force dynamic relation expressed by the angel’s will to act (by stay-
ing, awakening and making whole what has been smashed; I will call it the 
will to help). We must therefore imagine the angel as being a setting of a force 
dynamic pattern wherein the will is the agonist and the ability the antagonist 
(Benjamin repeats the setting by mentioning the attempt to close the wings), 
as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3
Taking into account the two settings we recognize a shift between the story 
or thesis that actually is given and the other one that could be given. I would like 
to emphasize two points in this argument that seem to repeat on a structural 
or cognitive level what Benjamin’s thesis is about: Wherever causation is, there 
is a story behind it, or in other words, “Causation is born in the past.” (Brandt 
2004: 76). And second: It is precisely in the givenness of the setting that one 
finds the potentiality of its otherness, or in other words, that the story could 
be different. One easily recognizes how this structure works in figure 4 (now 
following Brandt’s model “On Causation and Narration”; Brandt 2004: 69-86). 
 
Antagonist = abilityAgonist = will




The shift in the angel’s action line opens an undefined space between what 
is actually given (and to be observed) and what could be imagined instead of it. 
You see that Benjamin’s thesis does not live just by its factuality; it turns out to 
establish potentiality as well – by the simple means of force dynamic patterns 
that visibly work in it.
I should now turn to a second story within the thesis, namely the story of 
how to perceive history, which I mentioned above in point 3: The angel sees 
things differently. We find two ways of perceiving history in the text: first “our 
view” (expressed by “Where we perceive a chain of events”) and second the 
angel’s view: “he sees one single catastrophe”. There is a shift in perception, 
forced by the angel’s strange point of view, as shown in figure 5. 
Figure 5 – Force dynamics in the perception of history I
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   67 10/05/18   13:48
Peter Hanenberg
68
Significantly “our view” returns at the end of the thesis when one reads that 
the storm is “what we call progress”, our forth point above. If we put the two 
stories (the storm-story and the perception-story) together, we recognize that 
the storm brings perception back to “our view”, which conveys the ongoing 
undisturbed chain of events as progress. Figure 6 shows how this inversion 
works by joining diagram 4 and 5.
Figure 6 – Force dynamics in the perception of history II
So far nothing changed. Let us now try to clarify the last point, the miss-
ing link, as I called it. The question is: where does the wreckage in front of the 
angel’s feet come from? The answer is: from the catastrophe: “the catastro-
phe keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.” But isn’t wreckage 
and catastrophe the same force? Does catastrophe create wreckage or does 
wreckage create catastrophe? What is the agonist and what is the antagonist? 
Which force is stronger? Can wreckage stop or move catastrophe? Can catas-
trophe move or stop wreckage? Diagram 7 shows: this does not work. 




So, we might look for a better agent that makes catastrophe and wreckage, 
and of course we suspect of the storm. But the storm is not guilty, as one clear-
ly recognizes in the conjunction in the following sentence: “The storm irresistibly 
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris 
before him grows skyward.” The pile of debris grows not because of the storm 
but during the storm, there is strictly no causal relation between catastrophe 
and storm – just a temporal one, which is not a question of force dynamics but 
of time structure and we should be careful not to mix up these things. In time 
conception, “while” is a very interesting conjunction, because it brings things 
and things, and people and people, and things and people together. Thus, 
it does not belong to the sequential or physical domain of time conception, 
but to the so-called social domain that focuses on the aspectual dimension. 
Things happening at the same time are time-related but not force-dependent 
from each other. Furthermore, in Benjamin’s thesis this time conception builds 
up a very interesting structure in which time and space are blended together. 
The keywords are “into the future” and “skyward”, that open an own space of 
time-space correlation as shown in diagram 8. 
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Figure 8 – Time-space correlation
The storm comes from Paradise, but where does the catastrophe come 
from? It seems that there can only be one answer: the catastrophe comes from 
the angel’s strange perception. The catastrophe is a matter of perception: seen 
by the angel and right to his feet. Actually, even the angel does not know where 
it comes from, he just sees it. And the reader, taken through the angel’s point 
of view, is finally left on his own again, while a strange perception challenges his 
philosophy of history. Force dynamics does not help us understand this idea. 
We have to apply a different cognitive model to explain what happens here. 
Very shortly, I will try to show how blending (as a cognitive function) works in 
this perception of history (diagram 9).
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Figure 9 – A blend in the perception of history
Once again one finds the angel, a reference space that we call progress and 
a presentation space named storm. These two spaces are blended together in 
the “catastrophe” where things have been smashed. What makes this blend-
ing work is the idea of wholeness (that comes from paradise) in the relevance 
space, so that we understand the blending as the tragedy of not being “whole”. 
And tragedy results also from the fact that this process is irreversible; not even 
willpower can reverse the outcome – as shown by the force dynamic patterns 
applied in the text. This meaning turns the angel into a tragic hero and history 
into tragedy. This is what Benjamin’s thesis is about. 
The way back to paradise is closed: it is a matter of interpretation and – 
mostly frustrated – a matter of will. Is there any help to change things? There is 
no help, only the will to change. This must be the key to the high acceptance 
that the thesis usually finds. The main message of Benjamin’s thesis is the 
ongoing existence of a will to change things (or to make them whole again), 
independently of all force dynamic relations it is imbedded in. It is the messianic 
idea of setting oneself out of history, announced, as it should, by a powerless 
angel blown through the times. 
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But I will have to stop here, because we are going to get into interpretation 
now, and I promised just to deal with the way Benjamin thinks and not with 
what he thinks (or better: what we think that he thinks, or even better, what we 
think that he thinks we ought to think). I hope it became quite clear in which 
sense cognitive approaches and models (like force dynamics and blending) 
can help explain how Benjamin could think what he thought – and why we can 
understand it.
I would still like to ask one last and provoking question concerning  Benjamin’s 
thesis: On the past few pages we have gone through a chain of arguments that 
make up this chapter. Would it not be an interesting idea to think of the chapter 
as one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage arguments and hurls 
them in front of your feet? If you manage to do so, we finally know who the 
angel is. Doing so, we identify the basic elements of Benjamin’s ideas of his-
tory and their deep relation to conflict and memory born out of a special way to 
think. This leads us to the following chapter on how to conceive Utopia.
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Chapter VI
Why Utopia is possible – and why not.
Observations from Cognitive Culture Studies
From the standpoint of factuality, Utopia is a provocation both in cultural terms 
as in its cognitive conditions. How can we think things which really are not (or 
which are not real) – and which are even thought to be impossible? How can 
thinking the impossible be possible? How can the strange ability in utopian 
thinking be explained? 
The following chapter tries to answer these questions in five steps. First it will 
give a brief introduction to the main assumptions of Cognitive Culture Studies 
(I). In a second and in a third moment it will present some insights into innova-
tive thinking (II) and conceptual integration (III) which are at the basis of utopian 
thought. Then the presentation explores a grammatical feature as a means of 
making it possible to talk about the impossible (IV), and finally it will show how 
such thinking and speaking is not just an idea but an embodied experience (V). 
In a concrete sense, Utopia, thus, comes back to us. 
To recapitulate: What does Cognitive Culture Studies mean?
As we have seen, Cognitive Culture Studies is a recent field of research and 
tries to bridge knowledge from two different fields: from Cognitive Sciences 
and from Culture Studies (Hanenberg 2014). The so-called Second Cognitive 
Revolution has brought science to the recognition that brain and mind cannot 
just be understood as a machine. Cognition in its double dimension of think-
ing and feeling does not just produce information, but embodied effects of 
meaning. The Second Cognitive Revolution therefore builds on an extended 
understanding of cognition that includes cultural and social dimensions which 
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had been widely ignored in the previous phase where Artificial Intelligence and 
Computing seemed to be the ultimate goal of Cognitive Sciences. (We are 
not going to discuss here a certain tendency of current research to fall back 
to the first stage). Simultaneously, a semiotic turn in Culture Studies opened 
perspectives to understand culture in a threefold way or as referring to three 
dimensions (Posner 1991). A first dimension (without any priority over the oth-
ers) is the social dimension of culture, the fact that cultures occur in groups 
and manifest themselves through institutions. A second dimension is referred 
to as the material dimension of artefacts and any form of texts in which culture 
and meaning are defined, exposed and preserved (like shown in chapters III, 
IV and V). A third dimension is finally found in the mental aspects of culture 
which turn into codes, values, beliefs and “mentalities” that institutions expect 
and artefacts manifest. This is the point where Cognitive Culture Studies takes 
place – and where it works with the aim of informing research on the social and 
material dimensions about the mental conditions of culture.
In his reflection on the concept of culture, Per Aage Brandt (2011) has dis-
covered a certain tendency of mental and material culture to resist against the 
pressure of change introduced by – what he calls – socio-functional structures. 
This observation seems to correspond to other findings mainly on the adaptive 
capacity of the brain which is referred to as the plasticity of the brain. Seminal 
research on Brain and Culture offered by Bruce Wexler (2006) has not only 
proven the wide capacity of the brain to adapt to changing environments as 
it has also shown the effects of the environment and cultural practices on the 
neural structures of the brain (s. chapter I).
These observations seem to be relevant to the issue of Utopian thought. 
From a practical standpoint, brain and mind search a “correspondence be-
tween the external world and the internal one” (Wexler 2006: 169) – and when 
this correspondence does not occur one can either opt to change the mind 
or to change the world. Utopian thought then only takes place when there is 
something wrong in the relation between mind and environment that seeks a 
certain kind of equivalence. To describe this process, I suggest speaking about 
intramental translation: seeking meaning in blending perception and concep-
tion (s. chapter VII).
The classical example to illustrate the process of convergence between 
conception and perception are the so-called ambiguous pictures like the 
Rubin vase or the famous duck-rabbit image. The permanent change in the 
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perception of a duck or a rabbit represents the continuous effort of the brain to 
seek “correspondence between the external world and the internal one”: is it a 
duck or is it a rabbit? In order to ensure that there is nothing wrong, the brain 
has to try out again and again if its conception meets the observed – even for 
the price of not coming to terms with it. A lack of correspondence includes risk 
and distress – therefore anything has to be done to avoid it.
If Brandt’s thesis concerning a certain resistance to change in culture (what 
we could call its conservative or patrimonial function) and a certain drive to 
transformation (through socio-functional structures) is right, and if Bruce Wexler 
is correct in his description of the brain’s plasticity and in his observation of a 
certain limitation in the ability to change mental structures increasing over time, 
then we might find here the basic conditions of utopian thought: Utopia is ne-
gotiated between a tendency to stability (in brain and culture) and a plasticity 
(of brain and culture) open to change. 
The challenge then is that in utopian thought things that are out there and 
things which are not are brought together in a new meaning: a clear victory of 
conception over perception. But if the negotiation between stability and change 
is a permanent effort both in brain and culture – how then can its suspension 
be meaningful? An “ambiguous image” of a different kind might help us under-
stand the underlying process.
Flying pigs
From Benjamin K. Bergen’s seminal book Louder Than Words. The New 
Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning (2012), I take the image of the “Flying 
pig” to show that the mind is able to “imagine” things which do not exist. 
However, the example also shows that the mind does not create meaning arbi-
trarily. On the contrary, the meaning is built out of what can really be observed 
– though in a new form. Flying pigs do not really exist, but we know what ‘pig’ 
means and what ‘flying’ means. The creative process which leads to a new 
image is in this case first a simple add-on of a quality (flying) to an object (pig) 
which would not show this quality in the so-called real world. Our mind does 
not reject this artificial combination to a new meaning as long as it is built on 
accepted concepts – though in a surprising combination. Creative or utopian 
thought is foremost the combination of qualities and objects which normally 
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would not go together. In this case, the cultural shape of each of the concepts 
defines the meaning and form of the outcome, as the differences between a 
flying pig imagined as a Pigasus on the one hand and as a Superswine on the 
other illustrate. 
Figure 1 – Pigasus and Superswine (Bergen 2012)
Research on creativity has widely discussed “What’s Old about New Ideas?” 
– concluding that structured imagination both relies on and expands common 
concepts. Creative ideas, writes Thomas B. Ward, “are most often a mix of new 
and old, and there is value in attempting to assess the unchanging, underlying 
frameworks and the variations that are developed within them.” (Ward 1995: 
167). Flying Pigs in their double presence of ‘Superswine’ and ‘Pigasus’ are a 
striking example of how to think things beyond perception. Thinking or speak-
ing about flying pigs means to imagine a swine as if it could fly – or something 
which flies and looks as if it were a pig. A flying pig is an combination of two 
well-known concepts into a new idea. 
As we can think and imagine flying pigs we can think and imagine many 
things which do not exist. The principle of combination is a first step to think 
something new. Add a new aspect to an old thing and you are on the way to 
creative and utopian thinking. 
Conceptual Integration
If the flying pig can still simply be seen as a combination of old meanings 
to a new meaning, another cognitive performance takes place when one says, 
e.g. “This surgeon is a butcher.” This sentence is the famous example through 
which Line and Per Aage Brandt (2005) have explained the process of concep-
tual integration. Conceptual integration allows to blend a “presentation space” 
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(like the generic butcher) to a “reference space” (the concrete surgeon) whose 
qualities merge with the qualities of the generic butcher. In this virtual space 
one can actually see the surgeon as if he were a butcher, which leads to a new 
meaning in which the surgeon is criticized for “butchering” his patient instead of 
healing him. A sentence like “This surgeon is a butcher” shows the productive 
blend of presentation and reference, supported by a certain equivalence of rel-
evant attributions to each of them. The metaphor which the sentence produces 
develops on the ground of the distinction between butcher and surgeon as 
much as on the correlation of their activity in cutting. Finally, in the same man-
ner as surgeon and butcher are blended into their common quality as agents, 
meat and patient are merged into a common meaning of “being object to”. The 
argument “behind” the metaphor builds upon an ethical evaluation of both the 
butcher’s and the surgeon’s agency and the “objectness” of meat and patient, 
enhanced by the “fact” that meat and patient share their objective quality as 
meat.
Two observations are important for our further argument. First, one can 
see how a simple sentence and the blending of reference and presentation 
can work as critique on an ethical ground. Whoever uses the sentence in a 
concrete situation (and only a concrete situation allows for the use of the de-
monstrative pronoun “this”) does not simply state something but the statement 
implies a clear critique, based on the ethical assumptions of agency and heal-
ing. In other words: the sentence does not make sense as such but only as a 
performance of both a concrete illocutional relevance (based on the situation) 
and an argumentational relevance based on ethics. 
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   77 10/05/18   13:48
Peter Hanenberg
78
Figure 2 – Making sense of a bend (Brandt & Brandt 2005)
A second observation might complement the first: The simple sentence 
entails a given grammatical structure which limits and shapes the argument. 
A predicative expression in the form of a subject complement expresses a 
property that is assigned to a “subject”, following certain syntactical rules and a 
limited offer of linking verbs to apply. The sentence “this butcher is a surgeon.” 
is possible from the standpoint of grammar, it would, nonetheless, make no 
sense or at least a completely different sense than the original sentence. A sen-
tence like “this surgeon loves a butcher” would also make sense, whereas sen-
tences like “this surgeon blues a butcher” or “this surgeon moon a butcher” or 
“this surgeon is a very” would not make sense. In other words: grammar limits 
and shapes what can be said and what can make sense when said. The limits 
of grammar are the limits of sense. We should therefore be grateful to gram-
mar’s far extent (we will come back to this).
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Conceptual blending works in Utopian Thought, by blending the state of 
affairs with the discovery of what is not. By merging what is and what is not, 
the utopian thought allows to see what could be. The moving force behind this 
blend is negation: Where one finds hierarchy in Europe, one does not find it on 
the Utopian island, where one finds war in Europe, peace is rather the case 
there, suffering and explored work here and happiness and shared labour there. 
 Utopia emerges from the negation of what is into the claim of what could be. 
Without blending Raffael’s report of the island with the experience of Europe’s 
coeval state of affairs, the text would just be a curious account. Only when it is 
blended into the concept of an Ideal State does it start to make sense: as a cri-
tique and an invitation to change. Thus, also Thomas Morus’ Utopia does not 
make sense as such, but only as a performance of both a concrete illocutional 
relevance (based on the historical situation) and an argumentational relevance 
based on ethics. The technique of conceptual blending is a motor for utopian 
thought. 
Alternative facts: a case for the subjunctive mood
If the first step into utopian thought is the negation of what is and thus driv-
ing language to the statement of what is not, grammar offers special modes 
to deal with contradiction, absence or what now is famously called ‘alternative 
facts’. Alternative facts are a challenge to cognition because they question 
the correspondence between perception and conception, between what one 
experiences and what it holds to mean. The question of correspondence (and 
stability) on the one hand and change (and plasticity) on the other represents a 
dynamic widely explored in poetry and literature. The final passage of Heinrich 
von Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chili (1807) might be a good example for that:
Don Fernando and Dona Elvira then adopted the little stranger as their own son; 
and when Don Fernando compared Felipe with Juan and the ways in which he 
had acquired the two of them, it almost seemed to him that he had reason to 
feel glad.14 
14 “Don Fernando und Donna Elvire nahmen hierauf den kleinen Fremdling zum Pflegesohn an; 
und wenn Don Fernando Philippen mit Juan verglich, und wie er beide erworben hatte, so war es 
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The contrast between Juan, the legitimate son who was killed by the mob 
after the earthquake, and Philipp, the adopted child born out of the scandalous 
relation between a nobleman and a nun, could not be stronger: Juan is dead, 
Philipp alive, Juan is the legitimate son, Philipp a bastard, Juan is born out of 
love, but Philipp an achievement from fight and violence. Juan asks for grief. 
Philipp demands gladness. 
Nevertheless, “it almost seemed to him that he had reason to feel glad”. 
The sentence works against the stability of facts in different steps. “It almost 
seemed to him” introduces a verb which in itself oscillates between fact and 
fiction (what seems to be is not, but could be), an idea reinforced by the adverb 
“almost” which takes away any rest of certainty even from “seeming”. Further-
more, the seeming is not a general perception, but just “for him”. Then the sen-
tence introduces the new instance of “reason” (“that he had reason”) in which 
facts seem to ground. But this “reason” does not fund an argument, instead it 
supports a feeling (to feel) which finally is identified as gladness. 
The German original offers some more grammatical features which show 
language’s ability to play with what factually is and what conceptually is meant. 
Translating “so war es ihm fast, als müßt er sich freuen” literally into English, it 
says: “so it almost was to him, as [if] he would have to feel joy”. In this reading, 
the text includes the following (linguistic) options which play between percep-
tion and conception: 
– What is, is not what seems to be.
– What seems to be, seems (just) to him.
–  A counterfactuality can be introduced through the construction “as if”. 
–  The modal verb “müssen” (have to, should) refers to a deontic modality: 
the linguistic modality that indicates how the world ought to be according 
to certain norms, expectations, speaker’s desire, etc. 
–  The modal verb is given in the subjunctive mood which is used to explore 
conditional or imaginary situations (müsste vs. muss; would have to vs. 
have to).
It might come to a certain surprise that language has established a special 
mode of dealing with the discrepancy between what factually is and what even-
tually could or should be. The German language still maintains specific forms 
ihm fast, als müßt er sich freuen.” (Kleist 1984: 69) I take the translation from https://vdocuments.
site/kleist-earthquake-in-chile.html (15/02/2018)
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to express the subjunctive mood whereas English has mainly reduced it to the 
auxiliary word “would” or to quite abstract constructions like “have reason to”.15
For the purpose of our argument, we can take from Kleist’s sentence an 
insight of how language operates in the establishment of a correspondence 
between what one thinks and what is out there: the inner world of meaning 
and the outer world of factuality. This is an indispensable condition to utopian 
thought. Utopian thought is not only built on the ability of blending existing and 
absent realities and constructing new and blended meanings. Utopian thought 
strongly relates to language features – which at a certain moment might have 
raised for the sake of coming to terms with this contradiction between inner 
and outer world and which now are available to continuously open new and 
unexplored ideas. We can draw three main conclusions form this observation 
(which might be further explored): 
–  Words in general and literary words in particular can transform facts into 
an alternative. They shape experience and perception as much as the 
potential to change. 
–  Subjunctive modality is the linguistic expression of the brain’s plasticity. 
–  Literature is the domain of subjunctive modality.
Utopia is possible on the basic conflict between the (perceptual) experience 
of the world and the mental conception of how it could or should be. Language 
offers the possibility of performing this conflict and literature can artfully play on 
that – without further demands and without the fundamental risks of dividing 
the inner from the outer world.
“A jolt”: embodiment of Utopia
Other than the given real experience, utopian thought offers the exploration 
of alternative facts. In this sense Utopia is “nowhere” – but at the same time 
it is able to make a whole new world. How does this experience come back 
into cognition and how can the discrepancy between the inner and the outer 
world be blended? Is it just an abstract exercise? How is abstraction related 
15 While presenting this idea during a meeting of our Research Centre in Lisbon, my distin-
guished colleague, the famous translator of The Lusiads and admired poet Landeg White (1940-
2017) immediately demanded the audience to “Save the subjunctive!”
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to experience? These are difficult issues which Cognitive Culture Studies have 
only started to address. Once again, there seems to be some evidence (to me) 
that we have reason to believe that literature can help us to better understand 
this challenge. 
As mentioned before, one of the main achievements of the so-called sec-
ond cognitive revolution is the discovery of embodiment as a central charac-
teristic of human cognition (in contrast, e.g., to artificial intelligence). Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller (2012: 821) write:
Finally, the probably most crucial issue to be resolved in future research is the 
representation of abstract concepts. While the embodiment theory grounds 
abstract concepts in perception, action and emotion through their reference to 
concrete situations that can be experienced, the representation of abstract con-
cepts in the sensory and motor systems of the brain has to be further elucida-
ted for a broad range of concepts. This future research will decide whether the 
embodiment theory of conceptual representations can serve as an integrated 
framework for both concrete and abstract concepts. 
As Kiefer & Pulvermüller (2012: 812) have shown, there is an astonishing 
congruence in the cerebral representation of words and actions (Figure 3). It 
seems that the brain simulates the corresponding action when certain words 
are referred to. The use of language would, in a certain sense, simulate the ac-
tion related to the word’s meaning. As mentioned before, Benjamin K. Bergen’s 
book Louder Than Words. The New Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning 
(2012), shows not only how we build new concepts through the combination 
(and further also through blending) of existing concepts, like in the example of 
the flying pig. Bergen also demonstrates how simulation is at the basis of such 
‘combining’ and ‘blending’. Bergen writes: 
The idea is that simulation creates echoes in our brains of previous experien-
ces, attenuated resonances of brain patterns that were active during previous 
perceptual and motor experiences. We use our brains to simulate percepts and 
actions without actually perceiving or acting. (Bergen 2012: 15)
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Figure 3 – Congruence in the cerebral representation of words and actions  
(Kiefer & Pulvermüller 2012: 812)
Based on this observation, a short extract from Peter Handke’s “Essay on 
the Successful Day” might offer a valid insight of the embodiment of utopian 
thought. The “Essay…” widely explores the difficulty in describing how a suc-
cessful day might be experienced: 
I can give you no precise picture of a successful day. I have only the idea […] Sin-
ce there is nothing but the idea, the idea is all I can tell you about. “I’d like to tell 
you an idea.” But how can an idea be told? There came a jolt (the “ugliness” of 
this word has often been held up to me, but once again there is no other way of 
saying it). It grew light? It widened? It took hold of me? It vibrated? It blew warm? 
It cleared? It was day again at the end of the day? No, the idea resisted my 
narrative urge. It provides me with no picture to serve as an excuse. And yet it 
was corporeal, more corporeal than any image or representation has ever been; 
it synthesized all the body’s dispersed senses into energy. (Handke 1994: 129)16
16 “Ich habe von dem geglückten Tag keine einzige Vorstellung, keine einzige. Es gibt allein 
die Idee […] Indem nichts als die Idee da ist, kann das Erzählen nur handeln von ebendieser Idee. 
»Ich möchte dir eine Idee erzählen.« Aber eine Idee – wie ist sie erzählbar? Es geschah ein Ruck 
(immer wieder wird mir die »Häßlichkeit« dieses Wortes vorgehalten, und es ist wieder einmal durch 
kein anderes ersetzbar). Es wurde hell? Es wurde weit? Es griff in mich ein? Es vibrierte? Es wehte 
warm? Es lichtete sich? Es wurde neu Tag am Ende des Tages? Nein, die Idee, sie sträubt sich 
gegen meine Sehnsucht des Erzählens. Und trotzdem war sie leibhaftig, leibhaftiger als je ein Bild 
oder eine Vorstellung, alle die zerstreuten Sinne des Körpers durch sie zusammengefaßt zu Ener-
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The “ugly” term “jolt”, the insistence on the experience being “corporeal” 
and the description of how “it synthesized all the body’s dispersed senses into 
energy” are a strong literary evidence for the embodiment theory. The success-
ful day is not just an idea – the idea is bound to “corporeal” experience and 
seeks correspondence with it. Bergen writes:
Although research on how people understand abstract language is still in its 
infancy, evidence like this suggests that abstract concepts are understood in 
terms of concrete ones, whether during language processing or on their own. 
(Bergen 2012: 216)
Other than Kleist’s example before, this experience in Handke’s text even 
seems to challenge linguistic ‘sayability’. There is no grammar category to ex-
press the successful day, no linguistic mood for such an experience. There is 
just a word, an ugly word which seems to point somehow beyond language, 
so that the text dramatically states that “there is no other way of saying it” and 
that there is “no picture to serve as an excuse”. 
Utopia is nowhere, just an idea – and nevertheless the idea can only be ex-
pressed in words based on embodied experience, simulating it as a permanent 
motor of presence. If Utopia would really be nowhere it would not be possible. 
By coming to a word – as ugly as it is – Utopia comes back to the mind: as a 
jolt.
Towards Utopia
Could we suggest then the following conclusions in which Cognitive Culture 
Studies help to understand why Utopia is possible – and why not?
The point of departure for such an understanding lies in the brain itself and 
its ability to seek correspondence between internal neural structures and the 
environment. Any discrepancy between the two needs correction, either in the 
reshaping of the brain or in an attempt to change the world. Utopia derives 
from this. “The sources of perfection”, writes Semir Zeki, “thus lie in the brain, 
and more specifically in the synthetic concepts formed by the brain.” (Zeki 
2009: 57). While the existing structures in the brain tend to their own reinforce-
ment, the brain’s plasticity guarantees such adaptation. The notion of what 
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is and what could or ought to be derives from this conflict between percep-
tion and conception; the conflict itself cannot be left unattended. Combining 
independent concepts to a new concept is as much a technique to come to 
terms with this conflict as it is conceptual blending. Both allow thinking those 
things (like flying pigs and surgeons as butchers) which would otherwise not 
be thinkable. Language itself offers adequate forms and structures to address 
such utopian thinking: in grammatical moods as much as in “ugly” words. As 
literature constantly tells us, language brings the unthinkable back to the mind 
– as an embodied experience. 




How culture shapes the mind  
or Why Columbus did not discover America
Roman Jakobson famously suggested three kinds of translation: intralingual, 
interlingual and intersemiotic translations. The following chapter seeks to pro-
pose a fourth kind of translation which might be called “intramental translation”. 
Before becoming a linguistic or semiotic act, translation is a mental process. As 
we have seen, the human mind is involved in a permanent process of relating 
what it perceives to certain conceptions of what this might mean (s. chapter I). 
This relation of perception and conception is crucial to our worldmaking. The 
process in which perception demands conception and conception builds upon 
perception might be seen as a process of intramental translation: receiving 
information and transforming it into meaning. Our mind depends on this per-
manent process of receiving information and conceiving it as meaning, based 
on cultural models. In this sense, culture shapes the mind by providing the 
models through which meaning is conceived. This chapter develops this argu-
ment based on a semiotic approach to culture and cognition and illustrates the 
thesis by drawing on Columbus’ difficulty to recognize the land he discovered 
as a new continent. 
When I started to think about how to explain that the Italian navigator 
 Christopher Columbus did not discover America, I had to address a wide range 
of problems. I asked myself in which language could I discuss the letter which 
Columbus wrote about his discovery of the Americas. Which language would 
be appropriate? The Spanish version as this is supposed to be the original? 
Italian for his compatriots? German for me? Latin for the erudite or English for 
the sake of mutual understanding? 
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Columbus himself did not speak any language correctly, moving as a poly-
glot between Genoese, Latin, Portuguese and Spanish – as Tzvetan Todorov 
(1984: 29) has shown. And his famous letter was disseminated through Europe 
both in Latin as well as in many vernacular languages. We even use different 
linguistic manifestations when referring to the person by calling him Colombo, 
Columbus, Colón, Kolumbus or even Christoffer Tauber (which is his name 
translated into German when accepting that Columbus means pigeon – and 
that it is its masculine form and not the feminine Columba – as I found it in a 
16th century edition).17 Hence, while we do not come to terms with a common 
word even for the person himself, we do still believe that we are referring to 
the same person and the same text and the same effect of having discovered 
America. Alternatively, in other words: Kolumbus, Colombo and all other forms 
of his name address the same reference. The assumption of the existence of 
such a common reference is the beginning and grounding of any translation. It 
stands on the same principle which is the revolutionary discovery of semiotics: 
that the sign differs from its meaning – and that meaning exists independently 
of the sign that expresses it. How much is this a mental challenge and how far 
is any enunciation from any certainty? – this is what current Cognitive Culture 
Studies research has brought to light. As we are going to see, a central issue 
of translation turns out to run even deeper: a reference to the vulnerabilities of 
coming to terms with experience in any sense. The process of coming to terms 
with experience by establishing its meaning I call “intramental translation”.18
Before addressing the very demanding case of the discovery of a whole 
new world, we should look at some of the findings in Cognitive Culture Studies 
to help us understand how intramental translation works. 
A symbolic system such as language is, by definition, built on an arbitrary 
relationship between sign and meaning but, in the case of iconic signs, one 
tends to believe they capture their meaning more directly. As we have seen, the 
so-called ambiguous images convey evidence of a certain complexity in which 
resemblance and meaning count on a process of identification which matches 
17 Fracanzano da Montalboddo, Newe vnbekanthe landte Und ein newe weldte in kurtz ver-
ganger zeythe erfunden, Nürnberg, Stüchß, 1508, cap. LXXXIIII. 
18 I first used the term in 2015 in the introduction to the volume A New Visibility: On Culture, 
Translation and Cognition, (Hanenberg ed. 2015).
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one and fails another. In the fore-mentioned rabbit-duck image, the observer 
switches between the perception of the duck and the rabbit – which means 
that the same visual input is related either to the recognition of the concept of 
a duck or the recognition of the concept of a rabbit. Nelson Goodman stated 
famously that “conception without perception is merely empty, perception with-
out conception is blind (totally inoperative)” (Goodman 1978: 6). In other words, 
the brain adds to the visual input a pre-existing concept which only then con-
veys meaning to the perceived object. This is why one can see either the duck 
or the rabbit but never both at the same time. The meaning of the object does 
not only depend on what it is (and in fact the image is nothing more than an 
assemblage of lines); adding a concept becomes necessary in order for per-
ception to work at all (s. chapter 1). 
Intramental translation guarantees that any assemblage of lines or any other 
perceptual input at least makes some sense – by referring to concepts already 
held by the brain. Intramental translation allows us to say: “This is a duck”. Or: 
“The duck has a beak”. Or: “The rabbit has floppy ears”. The mental process of 
making sense of experience and perception is a process of translation: trans-
forming input into meaning. 
Ambiguous images demonstrate how this process works. One can quite 
easily imagine how important such a process is in evolutionary terms – referring 
firstly to indexicality. This makes a decisive difference when a creature is able to 
translate a certain index, let us say: a brown flowing mane not into the concept 
of a bush but rather into a lion and consequently into the notion of danger. This 
might also explain why the perception switches every three seconds: if it is not 
a bush, the creature should run away immediately.
The splendours and miseries of the brain, as Semir Zeki (2009) called them, 
depend on a permanent interplay of perception and conception. The transla-
tion of any perceptional input into a conceptual frame establishes what we 
call meaning. Research on concepts is currently one of the more challenging 
fields of Cultural Neurosciences as a New Science of Meaning (Bergen 2012), 
departing from the general assumption of the embodiment of mental process-
es. There seems to be evidence for mutual shaping: as much as perception 
shapes conception, conception determines perception – as we have seen in 
this case of an ambiguous image. 
Neuroscientist Bruce Wexler’s argument that brain and environment engage 
in permanent negotiation over establishing equivalency between that perceived 
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and that conceived is key to understanding intramental translation. As ex-
plained in chapter I, internal neural structures seek correspondence “to those 
aspects of environmental stimulation that are most commonly experienced by 
a particular individual” (Wexler 2016: 169). These internal neural structures ap-
pear as memory clusters of many kinds: as procedural, perceptual, semantic 
or episodic memories to which new experiences can be related. Many of these 
memories are individual even though their content is shaped and trained by 
social and cultural processes. 
From a distinct perspective, anthropologist Bradd Shore has suggested 
conceiving of culture itself “as a very large and heterogeneous collection of 
models or what psychologists sometimes call schemes” (Shore 1998: 44). As 
he explains, the “notion of model provides a bridge between the empiricist 
concept of culture as ‘objects’ and the cognitive concept of culture as forms 
of knowledge (or, more pretentiously, as mental representations)” (Shore 1998: 
44). In this sense, culture itself would rely on both the individual mind and 
the environment, counting on a similar process as that establishing meaning 
through intramental translation. Therefore, Neuroscience and Anthropology 
sustain those definitions of culture which link it to the construction of meaning. 
In this sense, Cognitive Culture Studies brings the mind back to culture and the 
culture back to the brain where they meet under the auspices of the intramental 
translation process.
Bradd Shore’s suggestion of perceiving culture “as a very large and hetero-
geneous collection of models” allows us to understand how culture shapes the 
mind. Understanding a “cultural model as ‘a cognitive schema that is intersub-
jectively shared by a cultural group’” (Shore 1998: 45) means recognizing that 
mental models are simultaneously both personal and conventional. 
Shore distinguishes between linguistic models (such as scripts or tropes) 
and non-linguistic models (such as image schemas or emotion models). He 
further distinguishes between expressive and ludic models or theories and task 
models. For our purpose, the concept that he terms “oriental models” seems 
especially interesting. They include, among others, spatial models (such as 
area maps or navigational models), temporal models, social orientation mod-
els such as models of social relations, rituals or social role sets and of course 
divinatory models. 
Many of these models belong to the “hidden dimension” of human behav-
iour, as Edward T. Hall (1990) named it, responsible for that described as the 
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cultural iceberg in which the vast bulk of its size remains invisible at the surface. 
Cultural models build a “deep structure of meaning”, as Per Aage Brandt has 
put it, which “would be a constitutive instance at a grounding level, a struc-
turation of thinking proper, or of pure imagining, bound to be expressed and 
manifested through a process of concretizing transpositions or translations” 
(Brandt 2004: 258-259). This deep meaning then translates into certain forms 
of surface meaning, which can be both observed and described. 
When we look at the letter Columbus wrote on his first travel across the 
Atlantic, we will thus look at the surface meaning to discover its deep structure, 
translated to the surface. “The expressed and expression-bound meaning (the 
surface content)” writes Brandt, is “thus seen as a translation (or transposition, 
transformation, or conversion) into some form of verbal discourse or some 
non-verbal semiotic system, of an underlying, non-discursive meaning (deep 
content)” (Brandt 2004: 259). This deep content, which anticipates both per-
ception and expression, is the object of a double intramental translation: it is 
stimulated, addressed and activated by perception (and thus perception trans-
lates into conception) and it is identified and expressed in verbal or non-verbal 
forms (and thus conception translates into that perceived). Deep content may 
also be referred to as “tacit knowledge” as I have tried to show in chapter II, 
exploring Michael Polanyi’s famous expression that “we know more than we 
can tell” (Polanyi 2009: 4). 
Intramental translation therefore constitutes the way in which we make 
sense of the world. We rely on cultural models clustered into the embodied 
neuronal structures that provide the deep content for intramental translation 
in turn enabling us to understand the world we live in. Whenever this world 
changes, intramental translation gets into trouble and must try to adapt to 
the new experience. Furthermore, the embodied neuronal structures and the 
cultural models they have built generate a certain resistance to any change. 
Structures and models – though alterable and plastic by definition – tend to 
stabilize, because their function is exactly that of ensuring a certain degree of 
stability amidst the overwhelming mass of experiences and information. This 
is the challenge of the human condition in its deep cultural foundation and its 
permanent exposition to a world of change.
I would further like to suggest that intramental translation works in a way 
that is present in what we usually term conceptual blending. Following up 
on Line and Per Aage Brandt’s Making sense of a blend, (Brandt & Brandt 
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2005 we might describe the structure of intramental translation as follows 
(Figure 1): 
Figure 1
In its search for meaning, the mind addresses two mental spaces: a presen-
tation space for a concept or a cultural model on the one hand, and the refer-
ence space for a given experience or perception on the other. These two mental 
spaces merge into a blended space, where the special features of percep-
tion and the general features of the model correspond. The general relevance 
driver for such a blend is the basic assumption that experience and the cultural 
model or perception and conception have to correspond with each other. This 
correspondence is then translated into meaning, the first, tacit and most im-
portant intramental translation. A second step links this first mental translation 
finally to the semiotic space where the translation can be expressed verbally or 
non-verbally. We can observe intramental translation therefore by drawing back 
from the semiotic expression to the translation of two different mental spaces 
into meaning: emerging from the correspondence between the presentation 
space of a cultural model and the reference space of a given experience. 
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If intramental translation is such a complex process of understanding, shap-
ing and sustaining what then emerges as meaning, we may now try to observe 
this process in a historical document which is indeed a mental and narrative 
construction of what was later named the New World: the most radical ever 
change in the perception of the world. Columbus wrote his letter on his return 
from his voyage as information for his sponsor Luis de Santángel, the treasurer 
to the Spanish King. It was first published in Spanish in 1493 and then in Latin 
later in the same year.
The main issue for Columbus’ writing was to make sure his sponsor be-
lieved in the project he had set up: sailing to the West would open the way to 
India. Therefore, a huge amount of information provided by the Columbus letter 
addresses the issue of spatial orientation which simultaneously serves as proof 
that Columbus achieved his goal:
Sir:
Since I know that you will be pleased by the great victory which Our Lord has 
given me on my voyage, I am writing you this letter, from which you will learn 
how in twenty days I crossed to the Indies with the fleet which the King and 
Queen, our most illustrious sovereigns, gave me. I found there very many islands 
inhabited by people without number, and I have taken possession of them all on 
behalf of Their Highnesses by proclamation and by unfurling the royal standard, 
and I was not contradicted.19
The whole text is written under this condition – or in other words: the whole 
experience is translated into a concept which might satisfy both the desire for 
understanding and the necessity for justification. There is no space and no 
need for a New World because everything which Columbus discovers cor-
responds to what he had previously conceived of finding. However, the reality 
needs appropriation which fills any eventual gap between the preconceived 
model and the reality observed. Appropriation is an act of strengthening the 
relationship between perception and conception, an act which occurs on the 
symbolic level. Unfurling the royal standard is such a symbolic act – and naming 
represents another such case. Attributing a name to someone or something is 
19 All quotes taken from the website “Early Modern Spain at King’s College London”; http://
www.ems.kcl.ac.uk/content/etext/e022.html (15/10/2017).
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an act which establishes both individuality (as something which is called in this 
way) and addressability within the existing symbolic framework. That is what 
Columbus presents in the second paragraph of his letter:
To the first island I found I gave the name San Salvador in memory of His High 
Majesty who miraculously has given all this; the Indians call it Guanahaní. To the 
second I gave the name the island of Santa María de Concepción; to the third, 
Fernandina; to the fourth, Isabela; to the fifth, the island of Juana, and so on, to 
each a new name. 
In the process of naming, Columbus even seems aware of the fact that he 
is translating the reality into his own framework by expressively stating the dif-
ference to the naming applied by the Indians: “the Indians call it Guanahaní”.
Appropriation and spatial orientation are the first efforts employed by 
Columbus to come to terms with reality. The attempt to make sense of the ter-
ritory continues with a surprising statement:
After many leagues, having seen that there was nothing new and that the coast 
was carrying me northwards, which was not the course I wished to take becau-
se winter was now drawing on and I proposed to make to the south, and as 
moreover the wind was carrying me forward, I decided to wait no longer and I 
turned round and made for a fine harbour. From there I sent two men inland to 
find out if there was a king or any great cities. 
This is interesting in a double sense. First, it seems that the “newness” 
rapidly turns into something which no longer seems to be new anymore (“that 
there was nothing new”). And second, there is no doubt on where Columbus 
wants to go (“I proposed to make to the south”). Both attitudes allow him to 
make “for a fine harbour” so that he can explore the region further. A fine har-
bour is a safe point, it is – in a certain sense – the end of travelling and a kind of 
reaching home, of being there (and of no longer being in a “translational zone”; 
Apter 2011). Accordingly, the following exploration of the inland is again defined 
by the expectation of that to be found – and not open to new, unknown or dif-
ferent things. The expectation is to find “a king or any great cities”. 
Again, Columbus is quite transparent in terms of the concepts which define 
his observations. His social orientation models guide the perception at every 
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stage: societies need to be organized and therefore need a king, and people 
must live together and therefore there must be cities. Even when this expec-
tation cannot be confirmed, Columbus finds a way to maintain his concepts 
by integrating the contradictory experience through the form of negation. A 
significant proportion of Columbus’ description does not deal with what he did 
observe but rather with those realities he did not find:
I found no towns or villages on the coast […] thinking that I could not fail to find 
great cities or towns. […] They travelled for three days and found an infinite 
number of small villages and countless people, but no sign of authority […] They 
have no iron or steel or weapons, nor are they that way inclined […] They knew 
no sect and were not idolaters […] Throughout the islands I did not find much 
variety in the appearance of the people, nor in their customs or language, neither 
he nor his people know what weapons are and they go naked [which means 
they have no clothes; PH] I have not been able to determine if they have private 
property, for it appeared from what I could see that what one person had was 
shared among everybody, especially in the case of food. 
Negation is an appropriate means of including into one’s concept those 
elements which are absent, translating a non-reality into the concept of reality. 
This method has been widely explored in the history of colonialism, turning the 
descriptions of supposed deficits into legitimations for appropriation: If there is 
no authority and if authority must be, then we can be the authority.
Columbus continuously tries to confirm his concepts so that the reality he 
found could make sense to him. Even when the difference is as radical as in the 
cases of absence or negation, the affirmation translates the new reality into an 
unquestioned, predefined structure. Thus, it turns out to be possible to speak 
about realities which indeed go beyond the previously known horizon.
Another very common strategy or technique in intramental translation 
is comparison. We also find a considerable number of moments in which 
 Columbus translates the new reality into his familiar cultural models by com-
paring what he sees with what he knows:
I saw that they were as green and as beautiful as they are in Spain in May […], 
and there where I travelled the nightingale and other birds of a thousand kin-
ds were singing in November. […] There are many harbours on the sea coast 
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beyond comparison with any I know in Christendom, and so many good, wide 
rivers that it is a marvel. […] On all the islands they have very many canoes like 
galleys with oars, some large, some small; and some, indeed many, are larger 
than a galley with eighteen benches. […] this island is larger than England and 
Scotland together […] This other island of Española is larger in circumferen-
ce than Spain from Collioure in Catalunya round the coast to Fuenterrabía in 
 Vizcaya […] they are all people of very beautiful appearance and are not black 
as in Guinea […]
Two of these comparisons are especially interesting. The last sentence 
identifies how Columbus had already integrated quite recent realities into the 
framework of his cultural models as the black people from Guinea belong to 
regions which had themselves only recently begun being explored by the Por-
tuguese voyages along the West African coast – in a way which seems even to 
have shaped the expectations concerning the islands Columbus discovered: 
people there could or should be like those discovered in other coeval maritime 
endeavours.
The second comparison, which is especially interesting, comes when 
 Columbus considers what he observes as “a marvel”. There are some similar 
expressions in the letter:
There are six or eight kinds of palms which are a wonder to behold for their 
beautiful variety […] There are marvellous pine groves and broad meadow […] 
Española is a marvel […] they give a marvellously good account of everything 
[…] the greatest marvel in the world.
The “marvel” and the “wonder” have been identified by many scholars as 
a main characteristic feature of Renaissance discourse, as for example by 
Stephen Greenblatt in his Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New 
World (1992), by Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park in their Wonders and 
the Order of Nature (1998) or by Marília dos Santos Lopes in her Writing New 
Worlds. The dynamics of curiosity in Early Modern Europe (2016). A “marvel” 
or a “wonder” is a concept which allows for the integration of those features 
which are not immediately understandable, plausible or conceivable into the 
framework of cultural models. Concepts like the marvel or the wonder are tran-
sit zones to open a given cultural model to exceptionality: something able to 
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be conceived as unconceivable. Marvel and wonder are placeholders for the 
mentally untranslatable. 
By using terms such as wonder or marvel, Columbus seems aware that his 
description borders on certain limits of the given cultural model – but still ad-
dressable within that same model. Columbus deploys the concept of wonder 
and marvel quite conservatively, at least compared with later travellers and au-
thors who wanted to stress the newness of their discoveries. However, though 
it is his strategy to confirm his findings as within the previously defined project 
and within his cultural expectations, he cannot completely abstain from using 
those concepts that allow him to mark out the borderline with the unexpected. 
Wonder and marvel have always been part of the pre-scientific discourse. 
At one moment of his letter, Columbus directly includes the marvellous myth of 
Amazonia (which Marco Polo’s travelogue had again disseminated). However, 
Columbus builds a certain buffer or a mental reservation into the description, 
when he makes it clear that this island “on which there are no men” (which 
means only women) has not been seen by himself but by Indians he met and 
“who are the people who have relations with the women of Matinino”. Colum-
bus seems to replace the real source of his model (which is Marco Polo’s ac-
count of Amazonia) with an imagined source that confirmed his model beyond 
experience. Today, we call such statements “alternative facts”.
A similar practice may be identified on those occasions when Columbus 
describes the Indians he had met, e.g., as we have seen, when he writes 
“Throughout the islands I did not find much variety in the appearance of the 
people, nor in their customs or language”. Of course, Columbus cannot dis-
tinguish between languages that he cannot understand – and later travels will 
actually confirm a wide range of languages without any mutual understanding 
among them.20 And he also cannot distinguish among cultures that he does not 
recognize in their own right. Columbus is still far distant from what ethnology 
will later term the “invention of culture” (as Roy Wagner, 2016, has named the 
anthropological work on culture) and which leads to other forms of projection, 
such as the concept of the “bon sauvage”. In this sense, Columbus has never 
been modern at all: for him, there is no new world to be invented. It is the old 
one that he confirms. 
20 Cf. Kolumbus 2006, p. 62.
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There are two further moments in which Columbus appears to struggle with 
translating his experiences into his cultural models. He writes:
[…] apart from these hundred and seven leagues, to the west of me were two 
provinces which I have not visited, one of which they call Avan, where the people 
are born with tails. 
Again, Columbus does not leave any doubt that these people “born with 
tails” have not been the object of his own observation but that he was told 
about their existence. The German translator of Columbus’ letter is more ex-
plicit on the real source of the statement, when he writes (now in my English 
translation):
There are people born with tails, following, as far as I understood, the Indians 
who I had captured, who really know and tell a lot about all these islands. 
Ptolemy, too, says that there are living people with tails in these regions and 
islands.21 
This German complement to the original text reveals the cultural model and 
its source which Columbus refers to without naming. Finding people with tails 
was such a scholarly sustained expectation that Columbus even finds them 
where they really do not exist. This is the powerful effect of intramental transla-
tion in exceeding experience. In the same sense, Columbus writes: “On this 
island there are many spices and great mines of gold and other metals” which 
is nothing that he had really found and observed but an immediate translation 
of his expectations.22 
Columbus was really struggling to correctly translate his experiences into 
the cultural models he relies on. In one sentence, he manages once to attrib-
ute reason to perception before then returning to the modelling capacity of his 
previous conception. He writes:
21 Der deutsche Kolumbusbrief (1900): “Dann wyter von der ob genanten hundert und zwenc-
zyg myl belibet mir uff der syten gen occident zwü prouinczen die ich nit durch faren haben […] Da 
werdent lüt geborn mit schwenczen […]. Dem nach und mir zu versteen gend die indier die ich mit 
mir gefangen für, wann sy wissent by einem billichen gar wol zu sagen von den inßlen allen. Von 
den provintzen unnd inßlen sagt ouch ptolomeus wie do lüt sind die schwencz hond […]”.
22 Cf. Kolumbus 2006: 58.
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So I have found no monsters, nor heard of any except on an island here […] 
which is inhabited by people who are held in all the islands to be very ferocious 
and who eat human flesh. 
No monsters, but cannibalism. The expectation is to find monsters, an ex-
pectation which Columbus rejects by experience. Cannibalism then comes in 
as confirmation of those mythical accounts which had referred to monstrous 
creatures and practices. The issue of cannibalism became a prominent fea-
ture in the later image of the New World and especially of what today is called 
Brazil – in a way that has been widely productive even in post-colonial times. 
However, there can be no doubt that the Columbus statement on cannibalism 
must be considered as much more a product of intramental translation than a 
realistic account of that actually perceived.
Wonder, marvel, myths and monsters are a very comfortable instrument for 
widening understanding and explanation without fundamental risks. However, 
as we have seen, Columbus even gives an explicit account of the possible 
limits to his understanding. Furthermore, on several occasions in his letter, he 
introduces a kind of caveat concerning the information he is setting out, a 
marker for doubt and dubiousness:
I understood well enough from some other Indians I had already taken that the 
whole of this coast was an island […] I am told that they (the trees) never lose 
their leaves as far as I can understand […] These provinces cannot be less than 
fifty or sixty leagues in length, as far as I can understand from the Indians I have 
with me who know all the islands. […]
Columbus counts on uncertainty concerning his own limits of understand-
ing. This is a clear sign of his mental effort to translate his experience into 
meaningful information – though his experience is significantly limited. In the 
cases quoted before, the limitation of his experience (which then constitutes 
a limitation of mentally translating this into certainty) is due to the lack of time, 
i.e., as Columbus cannot tell whether the trees never lose their leaves because 
he did not stay there for more than a few days, which means a lack of time to 
prove this fact. The whole scene seems to correspond more to the literary to-
pos of a locus amœnus which Columbus was familiar with than to observation 
and experience: “and there where I travelled the nightingale and other birds of a 
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thousand kinds were singing in November”, a nightingale which certainly does 
not exist in America but does appear in any idealistic and enthusiastic depiction 
of nature.23
The second example of a certain disclaimer in “as far as I can understand 
from the Indians” is even more significant because it shows how much Colum-
bus’ knowledge is limited and shaped by its sources. This is especially relevant 
when it comes to evaluating the riches of these lands:
On this island there is gold beyond measure and I have Indians with me as wit-
nesses about this and other islands. 
The so-called Indians serve as witnesses to confirm what on the one hand 
Columbus expected to find and on the other what he could not experience 
himself. It would not be incorrect to say that the Indians are taken as proof of 
Columbus’ pre-conceived cultural model. In intramental translation, expecta-
tion and experience work together as mutually enhancing. Before we return 
to this aspect, and leaving out any reflection on the fundamental issue of how 
Columbus might communicate with the Indians at all (the matter of sign language 
and the violence with which they were forced to learn Columbus’ language as 
fast as possible, is an important issue in post-colonial Translation Studies), I 
would like to draw attention to one passage in which Columbus closely verges 
on an “invention of culture” and the recognition that he had discovered some-
thing completely unexpected – and that his mental setting therefore could or 
should have been changed. In the following passage, many of the intramental 
translation techniques presented thus far come together: negation, expectation 
and appropriation. One aspect, though, is significantly missing: comparison. 
They knew no sect and were not idolaters, except that they all believe that power 
and good come from heaven, and they believed very firmly that I and these ships 
and crew came from heaven and in this belief they received me everywhere, 
once they had overcome their fear. And this is not because they are ignorant; 
rather, they are of subtle intelligence and can find their way around those seas, 
and give a marvellously good account of everything; it is only because they have 
never seen men clothed or ships of that kind. When I arrived in the Indies, at the 
23 Cf. Kolumbus 2006: 57.
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first island I found I took some of them by force so that they could learn and give 
me information about what there was in those parts, and in that way they soon 
understood us and we them, whether by word or by sign; and they have been 
very useful to us. 
It appears that the Indians applied a completely wrong concept to their 
experience of Columbus’ arrival: that Columbus had come from heaven. How-
ever, this seems not to be a reason to criticize them as Columbus immediately 
offers an explication for their misapprehension: “it is only because they have 
never seen men clothed or ships of that kind”. Well, a similar thing may be said 
about Columbus and his men: “it is only because they have never seen men 
without cloth or ships of their kind”. Columbus believes that the error is only 
on one side – because he would not recognize any cultural misunderstanding 
of his own, though he and his men had also never seen this reality before. It is 
striking the way Columbus identifies the Indians’ belief as a false belief – with-
out recognizing the fallibility of his own beliefs as regards what he sees. This 
is still more significant when we consider that there seems to be a common 
ground of beliefs that Indians and Columbus apparently share: “they all believe 
that power and good come from heaven”. However, Columbus does not allow 
any comparison at this point – because it would weaken his own intramental 
translation. And the rejection of any comparison which might become a motor 
of self-critique continues: “they soon understood us and we them” – this af-
firmation seems to be true only in a very limited way. When Columbus states 
“they have been very useful to us”, no such reciprocity can be established.
The belief “that power and good come from heaven” is in itself a blurred cul-
tural model: either you think of heaven in terms of spatial orientation or in terms 
of a divinatory model. The English language offers two words to distinguish 
sky from heaven whereas both merge in Columbus’ Spanish word “cielo” or in 
the German “Himmel”. What we can at least say is that any English translation 
must always opt between one or the other cultural model – whereas Columbus 
was able to leave it open. Certainly, his intramental translation of what he 
thought the Indians thought of him has to count on an undefined or diffuse 
range of meanings, just like the ambiguous image of the duck/rabbit or the 
ambiguous word “cielo” as “sky/heaven”. 
As with all translation, intramental translation is also not just about estab-
lishing sense, it is also about communicating it for further purposes; in keeping 
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with Per Aage Brandt’s expression: translating it from the deep content to 
the surface meaning. We have already seen several examples to what extent 
Columbus’ preconceived models and expectations shaped his perception of 
reality in the sense Bruce Wexler describes as the central relation between 
culture and brain, where – as quoted before – a set of internal “neural struc-
tures” tends to search for an increasing “sense of correspondence between 
the external world and the internal one, and progressively limits the power of 
sensory stimulation to change the structures” (Wexler 2006: 169). Such neural 
structures do not only shape understanding but they also determine future ac-
tion, as Columbus himself brilliantly states: “This island is much to be desired 
and, once seen, never to be left”. 
From this standpoint of a deep conviction resulting from intramental trans-
lation, Columbus can then develop his attempt to convince his reader of his 
success in finding a route to India: “the most suitable place, most conveniently 
situated for the gold mines and for all trade from the mainland here as well as 
from the land of the Great Khan which will bring very great trade and profit”. 
Thus, intramental translation appears as a continuous process linking precon-
ceived models, perceptions and a sense of future action: all within the simple 
goal of establishing a correspondence between perception and conception. 
Therefore, towards the end of his letter, Columbus proudly announces: 
That is enough. Eternal God, our Lord, gives to all those who follow His path 
victory over things which appear impossible, and this was a very notable exam-
ple. For, although these lands may have been spoken or written of, that was all 
conjecture, without eye-witness, and those who heard the stories listened to 
them and judged them more as fables than as having the least vestige of truth. 
Today, we know that Columbus was completely wrong. He did not find what 
he wanted to find, he did not see what he saw, these Indians are no Indians, the 
amazons and cannibals do not exist. And nevertheless; as much as he really 
discovered, without knowing it, a whole New World, he proved just as much, 
and again without knowing, the power of intramental translation. 
To conclude: Columbus’ letter offers new insights into intramental transla-
tion in the way that it allows the identifying of certain techniques applied in this 
process. The most outstanding technique is the oppressive implementation of 
expectations on experiences, which might best be exemplified by the use of 
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the term “Indians” for the people found on the islands. Expectation is a ground- 
-laying characteristic of intramental translation in a general sense but Columbus’ 
letter seems to be an example in which conceptual expectations hold domi-
nance over experience. A second technique is appropriation, which Columbus 
applies by naming the islands and landscapes – even while knowing that they 
hold different names in the language of the Indians. In Schleiermacher’s (2002) 
distinction between two different methods of translation, appropriation would 
be the type that is called “domestication”. A third technique is negation, which 
allows for not only addressing that experienced but also that missed or absent. 
Comparison comes in as a fourth technique, which permits establishing a re-
lationship between that already known and that new. A fifth technique involves 
extending the concept to the unconceived – which in Schleiermacher’s sense 
would be the translation method of foreignization: marvel and wonder mark 
such an extension in which expectations can be suspended. Finally, buffering 
the understanding by introducing a certain degree of uncertainty also provides 
a valid technique in intramental translation. 
This might not yet be the complete picture of what intramental translation 
is. However, with Columbus’ help, we might have discovered this whole new 
world of a powerful mental process in which culture and cognition blend into 
the emergence of meaning.
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   102 10/05/18   13:48
103
Chapter VIII
Culture, cognition and intercultural communication
Culture as a paradigm
When Alain Touraine published his book in which he declared culture to be A 
New Paradigm for Understanding Today’s World (2005/2007), many of the cur-
rent challenges to culture were still not quite visible: the protests against a satiri-
cal presentation of Mohamed in Denmark and later in France, debates about 
the burka, circumcision and children forced to be brides, the denunciation of 
Mediterranean cultures as lazy and ineffective, the position towards migration 
and refugees, the BREXIT-shock or the election of Trump as the 45th president 
of America. All these events and developments have shown how much culture 
is a political and social issue for the 21st century. The return of religion as a 
cultural factor, the new importance of ethnic belonging, the popularization (and 
often vulgarization) of discourses and practices seem to indicate an era where 
culture is at the heart of the debate. 
Knowledge about culture is therefore a key to a better understanding of 
these processes. Culture is a multidimensional phenomenon which cannot be 
reduced to a simple formula. Culture is about identity and community as much 
as it is about religion, nation, politics, geography, tradition, poverty, values, 
environment, commodities or technology. Therefore, the new and challenging 
dynamics of culture might be addressed by considering its three fundamental 
dimensions: the social, the material and the mental dimension outlined in the 
context of a semiotic approach to culture; Posner 1991, 2004). Culture is a 
social phenomenon as it is more than just an individual trait – and therefore 
nations, ethnicities, communities or religions often offer the primary adjective to 
describe a culture as, e.g., a German Culture, or an Islamic Culture. Culture is 
organized by groups and institutions (schools, governments, museums) which 
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share and promote a common way of life. But culture materializes itself neces-
sarily in objects, building, texts and artefacts, allowing for a continuous use by 
institutions and individuals. And finally, culture is in the mind of its members in 
the form of codes, values, patterns and scripts which allow for acting within the 
social dimension and making a proper use of its material manifestations. 
The threefold reality of culture is itself a dynamic relation. Individuals make 
up the social dimension as much as the individuals are made up by the social 
dimension. Mental and social effects are produced by texts and other mate-
rial agents like architecture, arts or laws. Per Aage Brandt has convincingly 
suggested that there is a certain tension between the mental and the material 
dimension of culture on the one hand and its social dimension on the other 
hand (Brandt 2011). “Socio-functional structures”, as he puts it, tend to be 
dynamic and in a permanent move to change whereas the mental and the 
material dimension show a certain tendency to stability, which means a certain 
resistance to change. Socio-functional structures are dynamic because they 
reach out to other cultures through traffic, travel and trade, in a permanent 
need of alimentation, development and growth. The material and immaterial (or 
mental) dimensions of culture oppose themselves against this drive to change: 
to guarantee the persistence of codes and texts (and artefacts, laws and other 
material achievements). 
Figure 1 – (Brandt 2011)
Per Aage Brandt’s model of a material and immaterial culture with a tenden-
cy for stability and the dynamics of socio-functional structures with its trend for 
change has been developed as an attempt to explain contemporary conflicts 
– mainly caused by fundamentalist movements against the so-called modern 
Western society. Brandt’s model can productively be expanded also to the 
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the level of the individual, the immaterial dimension of the mind (and its con-
cepts, beliefs or values) corresponds to its material embodiment in the brain, 
both showing a certain tendency toward stability and a certain resistance to 
change. The socio-functional effects of experience and perception may work 
in favour of a confirmation of these traits or against this stability, calling up for a 
need for change and transformation. Two observations may therefore serve as 
important assumptions when it comes to understanding culture, cognition and 
intercultural communication.
The first observation is the recognition that culture shapes not only the mind 
but that this shaping actually translates itself into brain structures and pro-
cesses. Culture might actually shape and change the brain. The question of 
“embodiment” is – as we have seen – a current and urgent issue of cogni-
tive sciences, especially when linked to the field of culture. Bruce Wexler has 
been one of the first scholars (as early as 2006) to study intensively the relation 
between brain and culture, claiming a “correspondence between the external 
world and the internal one” (Wexler 2006: 169), a strong motive in the search 
for stabilization which then makes changes less desirable and less probable. 
The second observation for a better understanding of culture, cognition and 
intercultural communication is that perception and experience actually “play 
against” the tendency toward resilience and stability – and therefore count on 
another outstanding feature of mind and brain which is the ability for learn-
ing, enabled by a surprising plasticity of the brain. Much as the brain tries to 
confirm proved and tested processes and structures, it is also able to adapt to 
new challenges and tasks. Though the brain runs on the reliability of routines, it 
remains capable of modulation and adaption, thus engaging in the continuous 







(3) experience and perception
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Culture as a collection of models
Three examples may serve as an illustration of this force dynamics on quite 
different levels. We have already mentioned the famous “ambiguous images” 
which can be seen in at least two different meanings. As has been explained 
in the previous chapter, what happens, when the observer switches between 
the perception of the duck and the rabbit, is that the same visual input is re-
lated either to the recognition of the concept of a duck or the recognition of 
the concept of a rabbit. Adding a concept is necessary in order for perception 
to work. 
The following little story illustrates a further aspect of the force-dynamics 
between change and stability. 
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimina-
tion and social justice and participated in antinuclear demonstrations.
Which of the following two alternatives is more probable?
Linda is a bank teller. 
Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. (Gigerenzer 2007: 93)
As Gerd Gigerenzer has shown, a majority of people would choose the 
second answer for being “more probable”. When reading a story like Linda’s, 
people engage in two assumptions: First, they presume that a story which is 
told before answering to a question must be a meaningful support for the right 
solution. And on a second level, they hold a concept of life in which the things 
one does at a certain time are meaningfully related to what one does earlier or 
later in time – something which people would commonly name the “sense of 
life”. 
But looking strictly and consciously at the task, it obviously turns out that 
the first answer is “more probable” because from a rational and logical point of 
view it is always “more probable” that one thing happens (Linda being a bank 
teller) than two things at the same time (Linda being a bank teller and some-
thing else). The interesting result of this example is that people do not rely on 
logical operations at first hand or naturally. On the contrary, people engage in 
assumptions like “stories make sense” or “life makes sense” – so that a simple 
equation turns into a complex interplay of meanings.
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Making sense of perception, of observation, of stories or even of life is a 
central human feature. Relating concepts and assumptions to perception and 
observation is a complex task in which people engage permanently – following 
the preferences acquired through education and learning. One other essential 
feature in this process is the way of linking things together as in the following 
example: 
Figure 3 – (Shaules 2015)
There are two ways of “grouping” these elements and making sense of 
these images. One first answer would be: the panda and the monkey group 
together because they are both animals. And the second answer could be that 
the monkey and the banana belong together because the monkey eats ba-
nanas. In the first case, the relation is built on a categorical principle (the class 
of animals). In the second example the relation between the objects themselves 
is emphasized. Some people tend to think first in terms of categories, other 
might prefer to address the relational bond. People develop different “cultures 
of relatedness” which sustain the way they make sense of experience.
Such differences might be interpreted as the main distinction between what 
is called a holistic and contextual way of thinking and a more categorical and 
object-oriented way, frequently identified as the so-called Asian or Eastern and 
the Western preferences for making sense of the world. It might not be neces-
sary to defend such a persistence of a “Geography of thought” (as it was called 
by Nisbett 2003), mainly when considering how much Eastern and Western 
ways of life got entangled in contemporary society. Nevertheless, these differ-
ent approaches to an understanding of things and their relation to each other 
explain both the need for making sense and the manifold ways to do so.
Which go together?
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Culture might actually be the instance by which such routines and mani-
fold approaches are developed, cultivated and shared. Through education and 
learning culture plays a central role in making concepts, assumptions and pref-
erences relevant. As Bradd Shore has suggested and as has been quoted 
before, culture is therefore “best conceived as a very large and heterogeneous 
collection of models or what psychologists sometimes call schemes.” (Shore 
1998: 834). The “idea of cultural models is a useful alternative to dissolving the 
concept of culture altogether into vague notions of power or discourse.” (Shore 
1998: 853) 
In this sense, Shore has presented an extensive list of models whose elabo-
ration might vary from culture to culture. Such a list would include linguistic 
models (scripts, lexical models, grammatical models, verbal formulas, or trope 
models) as well as non-linguistic models (image schemas, emotion models, 
action sets; gestural models, olfactory models, sound image models or visual 
image models). Furthermore, such cultural models can be distinguished by 
their function as in orientational models (spatial models, temporal models, so-
cial orientation models, diagnostic models or divinatory models) as well as in 
expressive/conceptual models (classificatory models, ludic models, theories, 
folk theories or task models). Cultural models are as much in the mind as they 
are shared through social imparting in education and learning.
Challenges of intercultural communication
Speaking about culture as a “very large and heterogeneous collection of 
models” and thus simultaneously as a material reality, a social practice and as 
a mental disposition allows for a better understanding of the challenges in in-
tercultural communication. Culture is not just the visible and tangible part of art, 
literature, cooking or dressing, which one tends to identify first. Beneath these 
superficial manifestations of culture lie their deep roots in concepts, assump-
tions and preferences supported by a variety of shared cultural models, differ-
ing as much from culture to culture as art, literature, cooking or dressing. The 
image of the so-called cultural iceberg shows intuitively what Joseph Shaules 
(2007) has called “Deep Culture” and what he has identified as the “Hidden 
Challenges of Global Living”.
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Figure 4 – (Shaules 2007)
As culture models and shapes cognition and behaviour in such a deep and 
comprehensive way, intercultural encounters are always moments of a special 
challenge to the force dynamics of a tendency toward resilience and stability 
on the one hand, and, on the other, the ability for change in learning and in the 
plasticity of our cultural and cognitive models. 
Joseph Shaules (2014) has nicely described the experience of intercultural 
encounters by referring to Victor Fleming’s famous movie The Wizard of Oz, 
in which Judy Garland plays the role of the little girl named Dorothy Gale from 
Kansas who finds herself suddenly and surprisingly projected into the marvel-
lous and magic Land of Oz. Taking Shaules’ suggestion one step further, one 










The first moment might be illustrated by the famous song “Over the rain-
bow” in which Dorothy develops her dreams and expectations of a different 
world where “the clouds are far behind” her and “trouble melts like lemon 
drops”. Intercultural encounters are always built upon previous experiences 
(like “clouds” and “troubles”) and defined by certain expectations – whether 
good or bad. This first moment might be called the “Ex-moment” of an inter-
cultural experience.
A second moment could be called the “Transit-moment” in which the tran-
sition from one to the other culture is made. These transitions often appear in 
the form of a voyage or a spatial change, frequently powered by technology 
or other means of extension. The impact of the transit-moment is often under-
estimated, though it is the immediate condition of the intercultural experience 
itself. Going for a long trip by ship, a tiring walk by feet, a short flight over or 
scaling several times: all this will define the moment in which one experiences 
the other culture for the first time. In Fleming’s movie this is the moment when 
Dorothy gets out of her bed and opens “the door to Oz”, while the movie pic-
ture changes from black and white to colour.
The third moment is the “Oz-moment” itself, as termed by Joseph Shaules. 
It is the moment, when Dorothy suddenly realizes how different and strange 
things are to her in this magic land. It is the moment when Dorothy addresses 
her dog by concluding: “Toto, I have a feeling, we’re not in Kansas anymore.”
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Taking into account what has been said before about the relation of culture 
and cognition, Dorothy (as any other person in an intercultural encounter) will 
then try to make sense of what she experiences in this different culture. She will 
use her models and concepts, her preferences and assumptions to make “a 
story out of” this experience. On the way to make sense of the “Oz-moment”, 
her narrative ability (as seen before in Linda’s story becoming a bank teller or 
more than that) will try to establish a constructive relation of challenging, strange 
or even disturbing experiences, always trying to come to terms with the force 
dynamics of a tendency toward stability and an ability (and need) for change.
The last moment of such an intercultural experience could then be a mo-
ment of reflection in which the individual beyond his or her first reaction in the 
Oz-Moment, and his or her narrative construction of sense through a narrative, 
engages in a critical process of pondering the experience and making it part of 
a rational argument. In this moment, the individual might even develop a critical 
standpoint towards his or her own models, concepts and assumptions. 
From culture to conviviality
The insights described in the previous sections correspond to the notion 
of culture as a central paradigm of contemporary society. The intimate relation 
of culture and cognition and the force dynamics working between a tendency 
toward stability and an ability for change might explain many of the conflicts 
which characterize political and social challenges all over the world. Resistance 
to change on the one hand and an ever faster driving socio-functional develop-
ment on the other hand seem to be a key issue for our global future. Neither 
tendency is wrong. They simply correspond to the human condition as de-
pending on its cultural models and as being constantly able to go a step further. 
Nevertheless, the main conclusion from such a reflection might not be a defeat-
ist acceptance of this condition but an effort to recognize it not as a motor of 
hostility but as an invitation for a plural recognition of cultural diversity. Based on 
and extending the studies by Wolfgang Welsch (1999), Paul Gilroy (2004) and 
Nowicka & Heil (2015), there might be five steps on this way:
The first step would be to recognize the relation between culture and cog-
nition and its benefits in the construction of concepts and models which help 
coming to terms with experience and perception. 
Miolo_Cognitive Culture Studies_3as.indd   111 10/05/18   13:48
Peter Hanenberg
112
The second step would be to address multiculturality as the recognition of a 
diversity of cultures and the richness of their concepts, models and expressions.
Under the concept of interculturality, a third step would consist in looking at 
the relation between cultures not just in their diversity but in their relatedness, 
offering new opportunities.
In the term transculturality the fourth step would then recognize the open-
ness, self-insufficiency and dynamics between cultures and their mutual in-
terdependence which leads to conviviality as a final step to guarantee that 
cultures can live together in plural recognition. 
From the standpoint of the individual, culture is about identity, culture is 
about “me”. Multiculturality is about the others, about “them”, interculturality 
about “you” and transculturality and conviviality finally about “us”. 
Future Cognitive Culture Studies might engage in enhancing knowledge on 
the challenges and the common human ability for living together. 
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Lang.
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